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ABSTRACT

The complexity of today’s operational environment where military organizations are
conducting campaigns to address some of the nation’s most urgent problems has grown
exponentially. To address this expanding complexity, the Defense Department introduced
‘design’ into its problem-solving doctrine as a method to understand the new and dynamic
challenges associated with this increasingly complex environment and provide a tool to augment
its current doctrinal military decision-making process. However, it appears military ‘design’ as
prescribed by the Department may be only marginally effective at producing viable solutions for
solving the complex, ill-structured problems that current military campaigns were developed to
resolve. This study seeks to understand the issues facing the Department’s design methodology
by examining two areas: 1) the common challenges facing senior planners responsible for
solving complex problems, and 2) the model or process that best enables design approaches to
support military decision-making.
This study is comprised of exploratory, qualitative research that examines these areas by
using a combination of interviews, case research and design science research regarding the
relationship of design thinking to the military problem-solving process. The research began with
interviews of Plans Chiefs from the Department’s most experienced warfighting headquarters
from the last two decades to identify insights and data regarding the efficacy of military design
thinking in the Department’s problem-solving process and develop an improved design model.
Additionally, case research involving observations of planning teams conducting problem-
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solving processes in situ to develop solutions to crises provided corroborating data for the
interviews. The case research identified current practitioner design challenges and products
needed to validated Subject Matter Expert observations and recommendations for improving
military design.
The research provided a number of results useful for modifying current military design
methodologies to improve its campaigning process. It concluded with the development of a
novel Military Design Model (MDM) for integrating design thinking with current military
decision-making processes and the joint operational planning processes. This model modifies
current doctrine with the introduction of a Solution Space and Model Space in addition to the
current Problem Space while placing the development of an operational approach for the
campaign within a larger framework of the Operation Space.
Overall, the research suggests that abduction is a better reasoning system for designing
campaigns as it relies upon inferences to define success as well as modifying current academic
theory regarding the scientific method cycle of research to more accurately describe the
relationship between identification of inferences and the generation of hypotheses. It also
identifies and explains the interdependencies between the proposed military design spaces.
Finally, the case research discovered products and processes from practice useful in both
deliberate and crisis planning processes based on the proposed model for integrating design with
the military decision-making process.
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CHAPTER ONE:
DESIGN THINKING FOR THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PRACTITIONER

Abstract
Design Thinking is a relatively new scientific method that supports problem-solving.
(Wass de Czege, 2009) The concept of ‘design’ and ‘Design Thinking’ is the underlying logic
that enables Design Science Research to support the development of solutions for managing
complex problems. It differs from the more traditional scientific methods based primarily upon
inductive or deductive reasoning to expanding knowledge. Design oriented approaches to
problem solving are more iterative based upon abductive reasoning required for Design Science
Research. Therefore, understanding the potential contributions of Design Thinking toward
solving problems will help any organization navigate and resolve complex or problems.
In 2010, the Department of the Army (DA) officially incorporated ‘design’ into its
problem-solving processes and over the last decade a variety of design approaches have been
developed by the Services and Joint Staff for inclusion in a variety military doctrinal publications
(Department of the Army [DA], 2010; DA, 2019; Department of Defense [DOD], 2011; DOD
2017; Department of the Navy [DON], 2010; Department of the Navy [USMC], 2016).
However, the variety of approaches published in these descriptive doctrinal publications have
created confusion among the joint force as to the utility of Design Thinking for military problemsolving and the proper use of Design Science in planning operations that solve some of the
nation’s most complex problems.
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As a scholar-practitioner, it is useful to incorporate Design Thinking into standard
problem-solving processes as it enables better solutions. This is based upon the process-enabled
learning that leads to modifications of proposed solutions over time as the designer comes to
appreciate the operational environment and the dynamics involved in any open system where
most social problems occur (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Unlike the natural sciences that rely
primarily on the ability to break down a problem into a systems of systems by using inductive or
deductive reasoning, social problems require a research method that uses actions and artifacts to
develop observations over time that lead to an inference as the basis of a potential solution
(Kolko, 2009). As the environment changes due to the introduction of solutions, future problems
are more easily anticipated over time that support a sustainable change to the environment
through the use of an artifact that successfully changes the environment (Simon, 1969). This
article explores the current challenges to current military problem-solving process in relation to
the fundamental premises behind the design theory first proposed in 1969 and modifies them
from a practitioner perspective to provide a useful model that military planners as well as
managers and executives at all levels can use to address and solve problems in an increasing
complex operational environment.
Introduction
The complexity of today’s operational environment where military organizations are
conducting campaigns to address some of the nation’s most urgent problems has grown
exponentially (Mensch & Rahschulte, 2008). In order to address this expanding complexity, the
Defense Department introduced ‘design’ into its problem-solving doctrine as a method to
understand the new and dynamic challenges associated with this increasingly complex
environment and provide a tool to augment its current doctrinal military decision-making
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process. However, it appears military ‘design’ as prescribed by the Department today may be
only marginally effective at producing viable solutions for solving the complex, ill-structured
problems that current military campaigns were developed to resolve.
This may be due to a lack of understanding among the joint force regarding Design
Thinking and its application to problem-solving. The 19 years that coalition forces have spent in
Afghanistan may be indicative of the challenges planners have in addressing complexity within
today’s operating environment. The nine years initially spent in Iraq followed by the current six
years in Iraq and Syria may be another. Any number of operations including those in the
Balkans, Viet Nam, and Korea point to an ability of the Department to successfully execute
tactical battles and operations at discreet locations over time but a corresponding inability to
deliver ‘strategic wins’ (Summers, 1995). If military Design is intended to enable operational
success leading to the ‘strategic win’ desired by our national leadership, then why isn’t it
succeeding instead of delivering what some would characterize as a Pyrrhic Victory1?
Design Thinking is a relatively new scientific construct that supports problem-solving but
there is no consistent definition either in Academia or within military doctrine. For the purpose
of this study, Design Thinking is defined as an intellectual approach to problem-solving
consisting of two distinct elements: Design Theory and Design Science. Design Theory is the
logical foundation that underpins the reasoning required to develop an artificial solution and
adapt it to practical application (Simon, 1969). Design Science provides the systematic
framework for developing the artifact itself, implement the solution and evaluate the impact of
solution on resolving, or at a minimum reshaping, the problem. It differs from more traditional

1

Plutarch (trans. John Dryden) Pyrrhus, hosted on The Internet Classics Archive;
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg030.perseus-eng1:1.1
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scientific methods based primarily upon inductive or deductive reasoning to evaluate hypotheses
that are tested through the scientific method (Bhattacherjee, 2012).
Similar to the military concepts of the ‘Art of War’ and ‘Science of War’, Design
Thinking consists of the underlying logic of design theory needed to develop the artificial
solution that enables Design Science Research to pragmatically apply that solution and thereby
address complex problems. Unlike the natural sciences that rely primarily on the ability to break
down a problem into systems of systems inherent to any closed system using inductive or
deductive reasoning, social problems require research methods that use actions and artifacts to
develop observations over time that lead to an inference as the basis of a proper solution (Houser
& Kloesel, 1992). Design approaches to problem-solving are more iterative because of the
abductive reasoning required to apply Design Theory toward addressing complex problems. The
resultant effect being that future problems are more easily anticipated over time which supports a
sustainable change in the environment.
This research studies the evolution of design within the Department of Defense over the
last two decades and how the development of dynamic, recursive military design models can be
applied to build upon current design methodologies. Based on interviews with the officers
responsible for developing solutions for the Department during the numerous crises in Middle
East since 9/11, real-world challenges they faced while planning and executing the various
campaigns were identified along with reflections concerning what they would have done
different in the military decision-making and design processes in hindsight. Additionally, case
research examined the current application of design during the military decision-making process
to identify the challenges planners have with the current process to corroborate the observations
and recommendations of these senior officers. From the data, both a model and
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recommendations for modifying the military design process, organizational structures, and
academic scientific method are presented.
Background
Problem Context
In order to properly examine the relationship of Design Thinking and the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) problem-solving process, one must understand current doctrine regarding the
Department’s processes and the introduction of Design Thinking into that doctrine. The current
version of the military planning process was first introduced by the Army in 1997 (DA, 1997).
Known as the military decision-making process (MDMP), it codified a deductive approach to
problem-solving.
“Army problem solving provides a standard, systematic approach to define and
analyze a problem, develop and analyze possible solutions, choose the best solution, and
implement a plan of action that solves the problem. Problem solving applies to all Army
activities and provides the base logic for the Army’s two tactical planning processes:
Military Decision-Making Process and Troop Leading Procedures.” (DA, 2005)

Figure 1.1. Seven Step Problem-Solving Model.*
*Source: DA, 2005.
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Military problem-solving consists of a seven-step process whereby a problem is
identified, information is gathered, solutions are developed and analyzed, and a solution is
recommended based on evaluation criteria. (See Figure 1.1) This model was used to develop the
MDMP. As doctrine explains:
“The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to
problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in
developing estimates and a plan. While the formal problem-solving process
described in this chapter may start with the receipt of a mission and has as its goal
the production of an order, the analytical aspects of the MDMP continue at all
levels during operations.” (DA, 1997)

Figure 1.2. The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).*
*Source: DA, 1997.
MDMP begins with receipt and analysis of a mission. (See Figure 1.2) Courses of Action
(COAs) are developed and then analyzed through a process known as wargaming. The COAs
are then compared to each other based on the discreet analysis of each COA during the wargame
and a solution is recommended to the decision-maker; either one of the COAs or a hybrid COA
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derived from aspects of two or more COAs. The MDMP process has been adopted by all
services and is codified in the Joint Staff Publication 5.0 on Joint Planning.
Consensus on design, however, does not currently exist throughout the Department of
Defense (DOD). Currently, there are two opposing views regarding the introduction of design
into the MDMP. The first viewpoint is that because military operations and the operational
environment have grown so increasingly complex, design is absolutely essential for a more
comprehensive understanding of the problem(s) that military campaigns and operations are
attempting resolve (Wass de Czege, 2009). The opposing viewpoint is that current doctrine
regarding operational art and design as well as the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) is
sufficient, if properly applied, and that design does not provide anything different than what is
currently done according to doctrine. In fact, “separating operational design from the planning
process is a purely arbitrary solution and a potentially harmful one” (Vego, 2009). Supporters of
this viewpoint often cite the problems the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had conducting combat
operations in Lebanon against Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) in 2006 using design-based doctrine
and the perceived victory of LH over the IDF (Vego, 2009). Critical examination of this conflict
and the role of design in IDF doctrine indicate that traditional warfare theory would not consider
the Israeli approach an operational design:
The empirical evidence of successful application of systemic operational design
(SOD) outside Israel simply does not exist. In the Lebanon conflict, SOD was a major,
although not the only, factor in the Israel Defense Forces’ distinct failure to achieve
victory over a much weaker opponent. This was the reason the IDF subsequently
abandoned SOD and returned to a well-proven traditional operational planning process.
(Vego, 2009)
For proponents of including design concepts in the Department’s problem-solving
process, the doctrine becomes more confusing. The first discussion of Design Thinking in
doctrine was published in Chapter 4 of the Army Counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) in 2006.
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Subsequently, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published in a pamphlet
addressing Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (FM 525-5-500) in 2008. Design
Thinking was formally introduced into Army doctrine in the 2010 version of FM 5.0 as the
‘Army Design Methodology (ADM). That same year, the Marine Corps published its approach
to design in its doctrinal publication, MCDP 5-1. The Joint Staff followed a year later by
introducing operational design in JP 5.0 in 2011. Over the course of the next decade, design has
evolved along several different paths with varying degrees of success – both in the understanding
of design as well as its application to problem-solving. Herein lies the problem. Figures 1.3 and
1.4 represents the Joint Staff’s definition of design as applied to the problem-solving process. It
consists of two parts: Operational Art and Operational Design. As JP 5.0 explains:
“Operational art provides the ability to better understand the OE, understand the
decision-making process, and provide a concise and sufficiently detailed explanation
without getting lost in the minutiae… Operational design is a methodology to aid
commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE.” (Department of
Defense [DOD], 2017)

Figure 1.3. Operational Art.*
*Source: DOD, 2017.
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Figure 1.4. Operational Design.*
*Source: DOD, 2017.
This differs from that of the Army Design Methodology (ADM) defined in Figure 1.5.
This format is more linear than the Joint Staff and flows from framing the environment to
problem definition to an operational approach or solution. Whereas Joint Doctrine uses a
combination of Operational Art and Operational Design, the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP)
defines the ADM as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand,
visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them” (DA, 2019).

Figure 1.5. Activities of Army Design Methodology.*
*Source: DA, 2019.

9

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) doctrine adopts a third approach to design. In their latest
doctrine published in 2010 the USMC defines design as “the conception and articulation of a
framework for solving a problem. Although their doctrinal publication MCWP 5.0 does describe
Design as a continuous, iterative process, much of the design products recommended are a result
of the steps the Marines go through during their current planning process (Rogers, 2011). The
Marine Corps approach to design was simply to relabel step one of the MDMP from Mission
Analysis to Problem Framing as shown in Figure 1.6.

Figure 1.6. Marine Corps Planning Process – MCPP.*
*Source: DON, 2010.
Finally, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has developed their
own approach to design known as the SOCOM Design Way (SDW). USSOCOM distinguishes
between Design Thinking and Operational Design similar to the Joint Staff distinction between
Operational Art and Operational Design. In this way, design is seen as complementary to
problem-solving but not necessarily integrated into the MDMP in the manner described in the
ADP or the MCPP. Figure 1.7 shows the concept of SDW.
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Figure 1.7. SOCOM Design Way.*
*Source: Ellis & Black, 2018.
Much of the changes to the problem-solving process and the introduction of Design
Thinking into doctrine is due to the increasing complexity of the operational environment. As
noted in Figures 1.3 – 1.7, there are varying methods within the DOD for using Design Thinking
to better efforts oriented on solving problems. However, the reason for doctrinal publications
within the Department is to ensure all the services speak a common language. As the review of
current design processes show, different approaches result in differing definitions that complicate
the joint force’s ability to solve problems from a common perspective. Therefore, to address the
problem, this research will examine the following research questions:
1. What are the common challenges among the lived experiences of senior Plans
Chiefs when recommending solutions for solving complex problems?
2. What process (artifact) best enables design approaches to support problemsolving for the Plans Chief?
Literature Review
To adequately codify the relationship between ‘Design Thinking’ and the current DOD
planning processes it is essential to define exactly what is meant by the term ‘Design Thinking.’
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The amount of research examining design published over the last few decades is significant
(Hevner et al, 2004). Operational warfare theory provides two useful paradigms for categorizing
this literature. When creating military campaigns and operations, planners use elements of
Operational Art and Operational Design to develop solutions to the problems that planners are
tasked to solve (DOD, 2017). Operational Art is built upon a paradigm more broadly known as
the ‘Art of War’ while Operational Design is more closely aligned with warfare concepts
associated with the ‘Science of War’. Reviewing and organizing the applicable literature in
order to define Design Thinking results in two distinct categories: Design Theory and Design
Science Research. When examining the academic literature involving design, Operational Art
addresses similar constructs in Design Theory and Operational Design addresses those similar to
Design Science Research. Therefore, it is important to understand the relevant concepts of
Design Theory and Design Science Research in order to properly define Design Thinking in a
useful manner.
Design Theory
The foundation of design theory was first presented by Simon (1969) through his seminal
work, the Sciences of the Artificial, wherein he states, "Everyone designs who devises courses of
action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones." This work distinguished natural
sciences that focus on explaining natural phenomena from the artificial sciences that focus on the
man-made solutions to modifying the natural world.
Over the course of the last two decades, discussions have centered on the definition and
utility of design theory. These discussions fall into three major groups (Fischer et al., 2010). The
first group opposes the use of design theory in Design Science. March and Smith argue that
theory is useful for natural sciences because of the descriptive nature of its research unlike
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Design Science which is prescriptive. This is because the natural sciences try to understand
reality while Design Science is focused on creating things that solve human problems resulting
from that environment (March & Smith, 1995). Hevner et al. (2004) do not use the term design
theory and instead focus on seven guidelines for Design Science Research. The idea is that
based on the iterative and discovery-oriented approach of Design Science Research, there is no
requirement for theory as the science creates in and of itself the baseline for discovery largely
divorced from theory.
The second group sees the artifact as design theory as opposed to using kernel theories to
ground the design theory. Goldkuhl (2004) suggests that design theory informs the design
process and the resultant theory is useful in the construction of the actual artifact. In this way,
design theory grounds the artifact conceptually, justifies the goals and values of the theory and
explains the elements of the design. It is also useful in the evaluation of the design. Viewing
design theory in this way makes it the conceptual justification for how the artifact will solve the
problem. In military parlance this would be called the Theory of Victory. In legal parlance it
would be called the Theory of the Case.
The third group argues that justificatory knowledge through the use of kernel theories is
essential in design theory. Venable links this to “utility theory” by noting that when one ties
technology X from the Solution Space to problem Y in the Problem Space one can predict a
certain amount of utility (Venable, 2006b). This use of Utility theory was also recognized by
Simon (1969) in his original work.
Therefore, the discussion regarding the definition and utility of Design Theory is
complicated as it involves three different viewpoints: one that opposes the concept of a design
theory, one that views design theory in terms of the artifact at the center of Design Science
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Research and a third that links design theory to kernel theories. Due to these differences, it is
important to develop a definition of design theory as well as the utility of evolving the theory to
further efforts for improving the military design process.
For the purpose of this research, the fundamental reason for having a sound articulation
and understanding of design theory is to develop the perspective and analysis for applying
Design Thinking to problem solving. As the intellectual frame of reference changes to account
for complex problems that result from open systems normally associated with social problems
(vice natural problems), the ability to apply design theory while developing solutions through the
production and implementation of artifacts enables military planners to resolve problems in the
most efficient and flexible manner.
The real issue is how design supports problem solving that is uniquely different from the
inductive or deductive methods of current scientific and Department methods. Kuhn recognized
that scientific method is tied to problem solving, “Scientists spend the majority of their careers in
the process of problem-solving” (Kuhn, 1962). The issue is that most planners attempt to solve
complex problems without a clear process for understanding or “appreciating” the dynamics
within the operational environment nor the unintended second and third order effects any initial
solution will create.
Simon (1969) observed that “efforts to solve problems must be preceded by efforts to
understand them.” Design theory is the framework for developing an appreciation of the
problem within an environment or conceptual space in order to develop, implement, evaluate and
modify the artifacts required to resolve a complex problem. There is a difference, however,
between design and the more familiar scientific methods applied by researchers and scientists.
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“The natural sciences are concerned with how things are. Design is concerned with how things
ought to be, with devising artifices to attain goals” (Simon, 1969).
Design Theory is the application of abductive reasoning and select scientific theories for
examining problems and developing solutions through: 1) the use of abductive reasoning
required for Design Thinking, 2) the understanding of complexity and its impact on both the
Problem Space and the Solution Space using select theories required to understand each design
space, and 3) applying Design Science Research methodology to develop, implement and
evaluate artifacts during the problem-solving process built to resolve or transform complex or illstructured problems (Peffers et al., 2006).
Reasoning
The first concept required to understand and apply design theory is how to ground the
theory in some form of the various reasoning processes. Bhattacherjee (2012) describes the
reasoning associated with scientific method as a cycle of research that moves between inductive
reasoning that establishes theory and deductive reasoning that attempts to prove or disprove
hypotheses related to the theory as shown in Figure 1.8.

Figure 1.8. The Bhattacherjee Model of the Cycle of Research.
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Pierce describes a third type of reasoning based on observations to form an inference
based on abduction (Houser & Kloesel, 1992). Inference becomes the specific case from which
deductive reasoning can be used to test a hypothesis derived from the inference and begin the
cycle of scientific method. Due to the iterative nature of design and Design Science Research,
abductive reasoning is the form of reasoning most useful in the process to develop inferences
from which to create and then modify hypotheses. As Sir Conan Doyle wrote, “Once you have
eliminated the impossible whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth”
(Doyle, 1992). This is the basis of abductive reasoning.
Consider the following example: a researcher comes upon a table that has 3 bags on it
along with 5 white beans near one of the bags. He observes that first bag contains only black
beans (O1). He then observes the second bag contains only brown beans (O2). He finally
observes that the beans laying on the table are all white (O3) and that they lay near an unmarked
third bag (O4). From these observations, he abduces the following inference: These beans came
from the third bag (I1). The use of abductive reasoning can be expressed as O1 + O2 + O3 + O4 =
I1
Fact: These beans are white; therefore they are not from the first two bags.
Inference: These beans are from the third bag.
Hypothesis: All beans from the third bag are white.
Once he has this hypothesis, he begins his experiment to confirm of reject it. He starts
taking beans out of the third bag until he has a representative sample and determines all of the
beans taken from this bag are white thus confirming his hypothesis. This can be expressed as I 1
+ E1 = R1 (where I is the inference used to develop the hypothesis based on the abductive
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process, E is the results of the experiments and R is the empirical data that confirms or refutes
the Hypothesis). His deductive reasoning is as follows:
Hypothesis: All beans from this bag are white.
Case: These beans are from this bag.
Result: These beans are white.
Using the results of his experiments, he inductively forms the following theory: All
beans from this bag are white. Inductive reasoning can be expressed as I 1 + C1 = T1 (where I is
the Inference, C is the case based on the research and T is the new theory). His use of abductive
reasoning forms the basis for developing a theory derived from inductive reasoning:
Fact: These beans are from this bag.
Result: These beans are white.
Theory: The beans in this bag are white or (if a broader generalization is desired
from the specific samples) The beans in each bag are the same color.
Understanding the reasoning behind design theory and delineating their differences in
reasoning from the extremely well-established natural sciences strengthens the foundation for
design theory. Because the development of artifacts and subsequent modifications occur through
a cycle of interventions, inferences are needed to develop initial solutions as well as
modifications to those solutions over time. These inferences are then updated based on
continuous learning that occurs when the artifact is introduced into an open system. As it is
extraordinarily difficult to predict how the system will react to the introduction of the artifact,
abductive reasoning is the most rational process for understanding. As opposed to deductive or
inductive reasoning that enables researchers to either develop theories as to why the artifact is
solving the problem in the Solution Space or confirming / denying these theories through
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deductive and empirical processes, abductive reasoning enables design scientists to continue to
improve artifacts in a logical fashion (Dorst, 2011). Simon (1969) notes this as well when he
notes that design reasoning entails modifications to “rules of inference already imbedded in
declarative logic.”
We base our reasoning on four forms of information. In February 2002, Donald
Rumsfeld, the then U.S. Secretary of State for Defense, said:
“There are known knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are
known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But
there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't know.”
The first group of “known knowns” are commonly called facts. The second group of
‘known unknowns” are more commonly called assumptions. The third group of “unknown
unknowns” result from inference and abductive reasoning as explained previously. But there is
also a group of “unknown knowns” that statistical analysis refers to as Type 1 and Type 2 errors.
These are flaws in reasoning related to a hypothesis. Type 1 (or the ‘false positive’) is rejecting
the null hypothesis even though it is true. Type II error (or the ‘false negative’) is not rejecting
the null hypothesis even though it is false.
Understanding Complexity Within Each Component of the Design Process Using
Attendant Theories
Simon’s (1969) groundbreaking work on artificial sciences codified his theory through
the use of seven broad categories. However, he continually referenced theories outside of an
exclusive ‘design theory’ to define his approach to the sciences of the artificial. These theories
included those such as Utility Theory and Statistical Decision Theory to support his underlying
explanation of decision sciences.
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To summarize his observations, Simon suggests there is an afferent (sensory) channel
through which we receive information about the environment. This is used to define the Problem
Space that requires an artifact to change that environment into one more desirable based on the
solution. The development of the artifact defines the channel whereby manmade artifacts modify
the environment to solve the problem. This efferent (motor) channel becomes the medium
whereby we act on the environment.
Acting on the environment is the second broad aspect of Simon’s theory. He
acknowledges that design is not focused on finding the ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ solution. Good or
satisfactory solutions vice optimal ones yields ‘satisficing’ solutions as opposed to best solution.
Satisficing is the term he coined to describe an artifact that is ‘good enough’ to be introduced
into the operational environment to begin exploring how to adjust an open system to address a
complex problem.
Although significant, Simon’s work does not tie directly to current constructs involving
design from a military perspective. And although descriptive, this initial work is only partially
useful in developing explanations or predictions regarding complex problems. Therefore, we
require an examination of additional theories that may be helpful in designing solutions to
complex problems. Supporting theories come from the non-linear sciences and some are very
useful in support of the efforts of Design Science Research. Current military design doctrines
trace the design process through a series of ‘frames’ for operational design. These include
framing the environment, the problem, and the operational approach. In order to have a more
logically informed method to discuss these different frames used in current military design, the
literature identifies several theories applicable to developing the artifact (i.e. the campaign)
required to address the problem.
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As the proposed military design model expands these ‘frames’ into ‘spaces’ and
examines the domain of design through analysis of a Problem Space, a Solution Space, a Model
Space, and Operation Space it is useful to identify any applicable theories required to better
appreciate each space. As the term ‘frame’ implies capturing the problem or environment at a
given point in time, ‘space’ is the recommended term as it implies a more dynamic description of
the object of analysis be it the problem, space, model, or operation. It provides a greater level of
abstraction. Subsequently:
The Problem Space is better understood using:
•

Problem Theory – problem solving involves carrying out a search through a

Problem Space in an effort to transform an initial state into one that satisfies a goal
description (Newell et al., 1958).
•

Sense-Making Theory – the process by which people give meaning to experience.

Provides insight into factors that surface as organizations address either uncertain or
ambiguous situations (Weick, 1995).
The Solution Space is better understood using:
•

Grounded Theory – an approach for looking systematically at (mostly) qualitative

data (like transcripts of interviews or protocols of observations) aiming at the generation
of theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994).
•

Abductive Reasoning – A method of reasoning based on inference as to the best

explanation (Houser & Kloesel, 1992).
The Modeling Space is better understood using:
•

Design Theory – proposes there is a sensory channel through which we receive

information about the environment. This is used to define the Problem Space that requires
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an artifact to change that environment into one more conducive to a solution. The
development of the artifact modifies the environment to solve the problem (Simon,
1969).
•

Chaos Theory – Small differences in initial conditions yield widely diverging

outcomes for such dynamical non-linear systems, rendering long-term prediction of their
behavior impossible in general (Kellert, 1993).
The Operational Space is better understood using:
•

System Theory – Models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems

or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component
elements, and the relationships or "forces" between them (Von Bertalanffy, 1968).
•

Complexity Theory – Examines uncertainty and non-linearity underscored by

interactions and accompanying feedback loops that constantly change systems
(Grobman, 2005). Based initially on systems theory, this theory supports efforts to
reduce the complex problem to more manageable medium- to well-structured problems
for changing the operational environment in an anticipated manner.
All of these additional theories address inter-related aspects of each design space.
Current design theory requires additional clarification in order to be more explanatory and
predictive. Examining some of these additional theories and their utility in solving complex, illstructured problems (as defined in Appendix 2.4: Problem Theory in this dissertation) provides
additional clarity for using design through the analysis of these spaces.
Design Science
Now that the type of reasoning is established as a logical foundation for military design,
and the applicable theories have been identified to support the analysis of each space within the
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design process, a design method is important to create a framework for military design. Design
Science Research Methodology (DSRM) is a useful framework for military design as its final
objective is developing a model of reality constructed from perception, imagination and
comprehension gained through the design process (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010). In military
design, this translates into developing a hypothesis for success of a campaign and then creating a
model whereby military resource is applied in the physical world to create intended changes to
the Problem Space.
Adapting this six-step method to military design and decision-making process is helpful
for creating the new model based on the coding data obtained during the research:
•

Problem identification and motivation. This step is used to define the problem and
justify the importance of the solution. Doing so will help the design team to gauge
the understanding of the problem.

•

Define the objectives for the solution. This step helps the team to define success.
This is done by inferring “the objectives of the solution from the problem definition
and knowledge of what is possible and feasible” (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010).

•

Design and development. This is the process of creating the actual artifact. In this
process, knowledge of theory as discussed in the previous section are used to develop
a solution.

•

Demonstration. During this step, identifying successful effects during execution of
the campaign (i.e. the artifact) that demonstrates where in the battlespace it solves
instances of the problem. This is important during assessment in order to distinguish
between successful execution of the campaign and successful application of the
artifact toward solving or, at a minimum, transforming the problem.
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•

Evaluation. The metrics of the assessment that shows if the campaign is actually
solving or resolving the identified problem are created and analyzed. This step takes
the design process back out of the standard MDMP and places the results of the
campaign on a strategic level evaluating if the artifact is accomplishing the policy
objectives that are driving the requirement for the campaign in the first place.

•

Communication. Communicate the problem and its importance, the artifact, its utility
and novelty, the rigor of its design, and its effectiveness to relevant audiences
(Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010).

Incorporating the fundamental premise of each of these six steps in the military design
process will provide coherence to the entire design effort, based on academic research.
Applying Creative and Critical Thinking
Finally, it is important to understand that much of the design process consists of
divergent thinking whereas the linear, MDMP is more convergent. Creative and Critical
thinking, as described in current military design doctrine is essential for the integration of design
with the current decision-making process used to develop campaigns and operations (Wright,
2019). De Bono argues that the biggest problem facing humanity is poor thinking. In his work
on lateral thinking, he suggests that creative thinking is required to enhance our understanding of
reality and develop systems for creating value as opposed to supporting arguments based strictly
upon logic (De Bono, 1995). He traces the current foundation of scientific method as described
by Bhattacherjee back to the Renaissance when Greek thinking came to Europe. As a result,
scientific thinking and method has evolved over the years into a highly logical thinking system
for finding the truth that is the base for science and technology. However, culturally we have not
developed a coherent thinking system for creating value. But Design Science Research appears
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to be making progress in developing this type of system. Therefore, evolving design theory is
critical and should include this focus on creative thinking. Creative thinking is currently a more
effective approach for addressing complex problems.
De Bono notes that current scientific method is good for explaining what is. However, it
is not very good at explaining what can be. Therefore, in addition to the quantitative and
qualitative processes used in current scientific method, there is a requirement to add another
process that uses an ability to design and create. Design Science is the process that serves that
purpose. Simon (1969) concurs with this assessment and states that the natural sciences are
concerned with how things are whereas design is concerned with how things ought to be.
To summarize the utility of the literature toward modifying military design to account for
the discrepancies identified in the data, it provides recommendations regarding the type of
reasoning required as a foundation for the application of creative thinking. It also identifies
relevant academic theories for understanding the various design spaces examined through the
military design process. Finally, the literature provides a sound and tested framework through
DSRM to create a more systematic approach to military design. The next step is linking the data
found in the research to methods and theories found during the Literature Review. A review of
the Research Method describes that linkage.
Research Method
This research examined the relationship and integration of Design Thinking into the
Department’s methodology for solving problems (i.e. the Military Decision-Making Process/Joint
Operational Planning Process). As part of the research method, an assessment of current processes
was required to identify the shortfalls and challenges with the current problem-solving process to
increase understanding of the integration of Design Thinking with that process. This exploratory
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research started with interviews of the former United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)
Plans Chiefs since 9/11. These colonels are the officers responsible for developing solutions to
the nation’s most pressing problems in the Middle East.
As the Department’s premier warfighting headquarters for conflicts fought over the last
two decades, it was important to gain insight from the USCENTCOM Colonels charged with
developing solutions to some of our Nation’s most complex problems and examine if Design
Thinking could have improved the problem-solving process through the use of Design Thinking.
These interviews provided substantial data regarding the integration of design and problemsolving by focusing on the lived experiences of the eight Colonels who served as the
USCENTCOM Plans Chiefs over the last two decades as they developed potential solutions to
the problems they were directed to address. Their lived experiences provided real world
examples of actual challenges faced by the nation and the military process to develop solutions
to those challenges thus providing unique insight into the relationship of design and problemsolving.
Additionally, the Plans Chiefs were asked to reflect on the effectiveness of both the
current planning process as well as the development and integration of Design Thinking with that
process. See Appendices 1.1 and 1.2 for the design of the research and the structure of the
questions to answer the Research Questions based on associated hypotheses.
As its formal introduction into doctrine occurred halfway through the time period
examined (i.e. 2001-2020), analyzing the experiences of the plans chiefs who were in charge
before design was introduced was compared to those who were in charge during the introduction
of design along with where design doctrine stands today. Once the interviews were coded and
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analyzed, trends over the last two decades regarding changes/challenges with the current
problem-solving process emerged.
Based on these trends derived from the inductive coding (Saldaña, 2016), a new design
model was developed to address the concerns of the Plans Chiefs and the challenges faced by
planners in practice. This model pulled elements common among the current doctrinal
publications within the Department and Services and added design aspects identified from the
research. This dynamic, recursive Military Design Model (MDM) organizes the military design
process into four conceptual spaces, adding two new spaces to the current design process.
In order to verify the resultant issues and challenges from the data collected during the
interviews, case research was conducted involving two USCENTCOM planning teams executing
design and problem-solving using the prescribed process according to current doctrine (DOD,
2017). The first planning team examined great power competition and the military role within
that context. A second planning team explored multi-stakeholder cooperation using action design
research to capture the data. The data collected in these two case studies confirmed several
observations from the Plans Chiefs adding veracity to the challenges identified through the
interviews by providing additional scientific rigor to the results through triangulation of data
from interviews, case research and Design Science Research.
The data and several artifacts produced by these planning teams showed the challenges
planning teams face in practice using current design processes and also uncovered solutions
applicable to the recommended model. Although a correlation between these artifacts and the
MDM cannot be established, causation of the problems identified in the case studies can be
linked directly to the artifacts developed to address those problems and substantiated the
recommended modifications to the current design models of the MDM.
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Finally, a follow up survey was conducted along with a focus group involving half of the
Plans Chiefs interviewed whereby they assessed the recommended model against two extant
models. The criteria developed for the evaluation were based on data collected from the original
interviews. The evaluation showed an assessed improvement of the new model over the extant
models.
To summarize the research method, it adapted a process described by Saldaña (2016) for
coding and conducting qualitative research and applied it to the elaborated Active Design
Research process eADR to combine the three qualitative methods used in the study within an
established process (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2019). Figure 1.9 shows the integration of the various
research methods within a process that is practice-inspired and theory-ingrained.
Using the four steps of the eADR process, the data was collected and evaluated from a
combination of literature reviews and interviews to Diagnose the Problem as discussed in
Section 2. As the data was coded and categorized, themes emerged from which to build a model
addressing the problem. Once the model was built, case research was used to examine current
military design in practice to verify the challenges raised by the Plans Chiefs and identify
relevant artifacts developed outside current military design doctrine to corroborate the
recommended adjustments to that doctrine by the MDM. Finally, several Plans Chiefs were
given a survey to evaluate the MDM against two extant models followed by discussion of the
new MDM vs current military design methodologies.
A review of the results of the research is presented starting with the Design Step of eADR
that resulted in the MDM followed by the Implement Step where artifacts developed by two
planning efforts were identified and concludes with the results of the Evaluation by the Plans
Chiefs.
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Figure 1.9. The Research Method for the Study.
Results
Designing a New Model
To determine the utility of Design Thinking in solving complex problems one has to
identify the challenges induced by greater complexity within the operational environment upon
the problem-solving process. Interviews with the plans chiefs provided the data needed to
accurately diagnose the challenges and shortcomings in the current process. Comparing the
shortcomings of the process prior to the introduction of design into military problem-solving
with the shortcomings that remain or are a result of the introduction of Design Thinking provide
the impetus for designing a new model (i.e. artifact). See Appendix 1.3 for a synopsis of the
codes used to develop both the Model and the evaluation criteria for comparison of the new
model with two current extant Department models.
From both the academic literature and Defense doctrine two components are identified as
critical part of the design process: The Problem Space and Operational Space. The Problem
Space is the component that diagnoses the problem to be solved within the operational
environment and the Operational Space is the environment within which the artifact will affect
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the physical environment to solve the problem defined in the Problem Space. The Operational
Space is where the current military design process creates its operational approach for solving
the problem though the development of a campaign using the MDMP process (DOD, 2017).
However, the data collected suggest deriving the problem by comparing the current
operational environment to a desired operational environment is problematic. As there is
normally great uncertainty as to the Endstate desired by senior policy makers along with
substantial difficulty in defining and then gaining concurrence of the efforts to achieve that
Endstate among the policy makers is a flawed approach. Instead, military design must account
for a distinct examination of a Solution Space to determine a theory that translates military action
into a strategically successful outcome by developing a hypothesis that the artifact will test.
Because this definition of success was not, in most cases, defined prior to the initiation of
military operations the U.S. continues to spend blood and treasure in places such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. This problem is compounded by changes in Administrations over time (e.g. Bush
Administration to Obama Administration to Trump Administration). Therefore, to rectify this
issue the MDM adds this space for examining the solution and developing its associated Theory
of Victory.
A fourth space is also added in the MDM called the Model Space. Once there is an
agreed upon definition of success with an associated Theory of Victory, one must build a Model
of the campaign that provides the operational logic of the campaign. This Model shows how the
crisis/problem will play out over time and the scope of the military involvement in resolving that
problem over time. In science, models are created in a conceptual space to better allow us to
predict the future. The depiction of the new MDM with these four components or ‘spaces’ for
military design are presented in Figure 1.10.
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Figure 1.10. The Foundation of the Military Design Model (MDM).
Having developed a base for developing the new model, it is necessary to examine each
distinct space within the recommended MDM.
The Problem Space
Examining the Problem Space results in two outputs: the strategic context within which
the problem exists and the problem statement itself. As noted earlier, current military doctrine is
flawed by trying to derive a problem statement by comparing a current operational environment
with a desired future one because it is too difficult to obtain consensus among senior national
leaders as to what that future state should be. The reason is relatively simple: once a senior
leader commits to that future state some available options for action are removed and senior
decision-makers are placed in a box that is extremely difficult to get out of should that desired
state prove more challenging to obtain than previously thought. This is because of the ‘sunk cost
fallacy’ that keeps an organization committed to trying to achieve a goal even though it is
increasingly obvious that course of action currently being pursued is ineffective and cost
prohibitive.
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Figure 1.11. Understanding the Problem Space.
Instead of comparing a current operational environment to a usually undefined future
one, every crisis begins with a key event or events that create the call for solving a perceived
problem. The real question is twofold: 1) is this actually a problem and is so why, and 2) is this
a problem that the use of military resource is best able to resolve? The only way to determine the
answers to these two questions is to examine the Problem Space and the Solution Space. The
answer to the first question requires a comparison of how key events are affecting the operational
environment and how that emerging environment is aligned with stated goals of an organization
– in this case, national policy objectives. If the emerging environment is inconsistent with the
goals of a given Administration, then there is a problem. The answer to the second question
involves analysis of the Solution Space as discussed in the next section.
Examining the operational environment in and of itself through processes such at the
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) does not provide an
assessment of the problem (DOD, 2014). Rather, it only describes ‘what is’ and not ‘what’s
wrong’. Understanding the facts bearing on the problem and its impact on the goals being
sought (e.g. national policy objectives) leads to a clearly articulated problem statement.
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There are two key theories that support analysis of the Problem Space: Problem Theory
(Newell et al., 1958) and Sensemaking Theory (Wieck, 1988). Key codes from data that support
the recommended methodology for this space are taken from the interviews:
•

“I think what the MDMP did not allow for upfront was the proper definition of a

problem. You were presented with a set of problems without going through and defining
it…so the process broke down almost immediately.”
•

“That was probably a reflection of both our understanding of the problem and the

actual environment itself evolving over time… over time even people who had been
former regime members, their goal was no longer to restore the regime.”
•

It's a very complex problem. So what we tried to do was build a depiction… we

built a framework in appreciation of what we thought the problem was. And I use
"appreciation” … because appreciation means “an understanding within a context.”
•

“What design brings and if it's followed is something that might have prevented

six to eight weeks of intense planning and absorption by the leadership on a problem that
really wasn't there…”
Additional supporting data for the Problem Space is available in Appendix 1.3.
From this data, it is possible to develop a recommended military design methodology for
analyzing the Problem Space. The inputs for the analysis of this space includes recent events,
the JIPOE, policy objectives and any recent assessments applicable to the Problem Space from
other campaigns such as a Theater Campaign Plan (See Figure 1.11). The first step is to identify
the event that sparked the crisis and any associated critical events in the operational environment
that apply. This is followed by a review of the JIPOE and policy objectives to place current
events within a strategic context. This enables designers to fully ‘appreciate’ the severity – or
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lack thereof – of the current situation. Once the strategic context has been developed, designers
need to determine key facts bearing on the situation to have a logical justification for a proposed
problem statement. The examination of the Problem Space ends with the production of a
problem statement diagnosing the problem that the design effort must solve. The two key
outputs of the analysis of the space are the Strategic Context and the Problem Statement. Due to
the recursive nature of design, the Problem Statement must continually be reassessed to ensure
its validity.
The Solution Space
The introduction of the Solution Space into military design allows a strategic discussion
to take place between commanders and their senior leadership regarding potential solutions to a
rigorously defined problem and application of military resource toward achieving the agreed
upon goal. At the heart of this analysis is defining what success looks like if the decision is
made to use military operations to solve the problem. Defining success is critical for
understanding when the mission is complete, and when the Department can end a military
operation and return forces to the United States.
There are several considerations for defining military success properly as discussed in
military war colleges. First is the idea of war termination criteria that dictate when hostilities
will cease. However, having an end to the fighting is separate from resolving a conflict.
Conflict resolution criteria describe the conditions required to have peace and must also be
defined. In other words, when the shooting stops, most military campaigns enter a “post-combat
but not post-conflict” period where military forces are not engaged in combat, but peace has not
been agreed to and the campaign continues.
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The Korean War is an example of this period where there has been an armistice in place
since the 1950s but there is still a simmering conflict that continues to this day. In order to avoid
this scenario, the last consideration of defining success involves creation of an exit strategy.
This strategy is tied to the Theory of Victory in that part of the hypothesis underpinning the
Theory must determine how the post-conflict environment is one strategically advantageous to
the United States, enables the withdrawal of military forces, and preserves the gains obtained
through the expenditure of blood and treasure during the crisis.
The Theory of Victory is based on the hypothesis that defines the role of the military
operation in achieving that success. The campaign becomes the method required to prove or
disprove this hypothesis built upon inferences derived from an examination of the Solution
Space and the subsequent definition of success. This ties directly to the assessment following
execution of the campaign but one focused on assessing the impact of the campaign on the
problem and the validity of the hypothesis upon which the Theory of Victory was created. This
is distinctly separate from on operational assessment of whether the campaign execution is
progressing as planned based on measures of effectiveness and performance.
An argument can be made that World War II was the end of warfare on an industrial
scale using a Theory of Victory based on annihilation of an opposing army and this Theory of
Victory is the same one that has been used for over four millennia dating back to Sun Tzu in
circa 2500 B.C. With the transition to the information age over the last five decades, complexity
within the operational environment has increased to a point where the ‘tried and true’ Theory of
Victory based on annihilation of an opposing force is no longer valid. This results in the
requirement to define how the use of military resource, which is no longer defined as force, can
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accomplish the policy objectives in a manner that does not necessarily involve the destruction of
enemy forces.
There are two key theories that support analysis of the Solution Space: Grounded Theory
and Abductive Reasoning (Houser & Kloesel, 1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Grounded theory
enables designers to develop a kernel theory that some U.S. War Colleges refer to as the Theory
of Victory. Abductive reasoning provides the logic for using inferences as the best explanation
for why the success criteria will solve the problem. Key codes from data that support the
recommended methodology for this space are taken from the interviews:
•

“What was defined as ‘success’ kept changing. If you're changing the goal, it's

very hard to have a plan to achieve the goal. And if you're changing the goal, you
continue changing what success looks like.”
•

“Honestly, if you asked somebody at OSD policy in 2004 or 2005, what does

success look like, the answer would be, well, what do you mean?”
•

“So you frame it. Your framing is a hypothesis. Because when you frame the

problem and you look at it and you say, I think it works this way.”
•

“I think there's a gap in doctrine right now at the more complex level of planning

for the things that are not known, that are not doctrinal assumptions.” (i.e. Inferences)
•

“We’re doing war plan development and we start from ‘this is our current

environment; this is what the fight is going to be.’ We have to identify one or two reasons
why we got Casus Belli and why we're going to war, and each one of those two are going
to drive us down to specific outcomes, and what are our national interests, what we're
trying to do.”
Additional supporting data for the Solution Space is available in Appendix 1.3.
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From this data, it also is possible to develop a recommended methodology for analyzing
the Solution Space (See Figure 1.12). The inputs for the analysis of this space include the
strategic context and problem statement developed during the examination of the Problem Space.
Also, a review of the facts is helpful for determining the known unknowns (assumptions) and
abducing the unknown unknowns (inferences) of the situation. The first step is to identify the
assumptions required to develop a hypothesis required to underpin the eventual Theory of
Victory. Although these are assumptions, they are treated as facts in order to develop inferences
that lead to development of the Theory of Victory. Determining these inferences support the
creation of a ‘Theory of Victory’ which is a working hypothesis of why military action will
achieve the policy goals that are impacted by the problem.

Figure 1.12. Understanding the Solution Space.
Next is an examination of the limitations on military action and how it will affect
accomplishing the goal. These restraints and constraints scope military options available to
apply toward the problem and help define the level of success that is actually achievable through
the application of military resource. This is followed by evaluating any efforts outside the DOD
that are also working to achieve similar goals such as interagency partners, International
Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations. For example, if “Doctors without Borders” is
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working on the problem identified, reinforcing their success may be the most efficient use of
military capabilities.
Finally, the analysis defines the resultant success the Theory should achieve. The
examination of the Solution Space ends with the production of a solution by defining a
hypothesis for how the application of the eventual artifact (i.e. the military campaign) will solve
the problem. The two key outputs of the analysis of this space are the Definition of Success and
the Theory of Victory. Due to the recursive nature of design, the Theory of Victory must
continually be reassessed to ensure its validity.
The Model Space
A model is a conceptual representation of a set of ideas, events or processes. Within the
Model Space, designers create an operational design of how a crisis will unfold and the
corresponding military campaign will ensue. Models enable us to predict the future and as the
future of most complex problems is uncertain and volatile, they provide a useful way to have a
strategic discussion about the purpose of any military operation being considered as the crisis
proceeds forward in time. This is done through the design for the operation. The operational
design provides the framework for how military campaign will unfold in time and space in
relation to the evolving crisis.
It is in the Model Space that the mission statement for the campaign is best constructed
because the purpose of the mission must be to achieve the success criteria developed in the
Solution Space as prescribed by the Theory of Victory. Having a concise statement of the who,
what, where, and when, that gets to the ‘why’ ties the physical military campaign to the purpose
previously defined by the conceptual solution and subsequent model.
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There are two key theories that support analysis of the Model Space: Design Theory and
Chaos Theory (Kellert, 1993; Simon, 1969). Design theory guides the development of the
operational design and Chaos theory helps forecast the unanticipated second and third order
effects of the campaign on the Problem Space. Key codes from data that support the
recommended methodology for this space are taken from the interviews:

Figure 1.13. Understanding the Model Space.
•

“I know intuitively that this conceptual design is a great way to inform the

process, the linear process.”
•

“So I think complexity changes this idea of this nice clean end state that people

like to have. But you still try to create one at least for how one operation may transition
to another.”
•

“I'm trying to be as unwrong as I can so that I can close the gap faster once I get

there. My presumption is we will never be right. I just want to be close so I can learn my
way into where I got to be.”
•

“I think that because we keep talking about how the world is more complex, and

the problems are more complex, and we do more stuff... I think that operational design
and coming up with an operational approach is a very useful tool. And it should be better
understood and utilized by a much broader set of people than currently go about it.”
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Additional supporting data for the Model Space is available in Appendix 1.3.
From this data, comes a recommended methodology for analyzing the Model Space (See
Figure 1.13). The inputs for the analysis of this space includes the definition of success and the
Theory of Victory developed during the examination of the Solution Space. Based on the
Theory of Victory, the purpose of examining this space is to predict how the environment will
respond to military activity in the most likely and dangerous ways to ensure the operational
design will be flexible enough to adjust to a dynamic environment.
The next step is to identify relevant trends emerging in the operational environment that
the design may exploit or must guard against. Based upon how the designer anticipates the
environment will respond to the model, the team determines the military objectives the campaign
will achieve in support of the policy objectives identified in the Problem Space. Once these
objectives have been understood, higher guidance is examined and based on this guidance from
higher, military objectives are created and designers list the military tasks that have been issued.
Additionally, they must determine any implied tasks that are required to support achieving the
military objectives and from this list, develop a mission statement that addresses the problem
statement based on success criteria (i.e. purpose). The two key outputs of the analysis of this
space are the operational design and the mission statement. Due to the recursive nature of
design, the mission statement and supporting design (i.e. the model) must continually be
reassessed to ensure its validity.
The Operation Space
The purpose of the Operation Space is to translate the operational design into an approach
for the military campaign. The translation involves moving the design process from the
conceptual to the physical space in which the tasks of all organizations participating in the
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military campaign are synchronized and executed in time, space, and purpose. Due to the
complexity involved in modern military operations, part of developing the approach is to
disaggregate the complex, ill-structured problem into several complicated, medium-structured
problems and assign each an associated line of effort that organizes military activity in a
sequential way to solve the complicated problem at which the effort is aimed. The output of this
space is the operational approach as defined in current doctrine (DOD, 2017).
There are two key theories that support analysis of the Solution Space: Systems Theory
and Complexity Theory (Grobman, 2005; Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Systems theory provides the
framework for breaking a complex problem down into several complicated problems that can
more easily be addressed through coordinated action and likely solved. Complexity theory helps
create an approach that accounts for non-linearity and the inevitable change to an open system by
the military activity that is difficult to anticipate within the evolving operational environment.
Key codes from data that support the recommended methodology for this space is taken from the
interviews:
•

“So you're kind of managing the conflict as opposed to coming to some definitive

end state. Maybe we are too deterministic and say, "We've got to have a clear end state."
•

“You get to a point where you try to have a product that addresses the complete

complexity of a problem, it just overwhelms everybody, you almost have to break it down
into baby steps and inform the complexity, bring it back into planning; try to have a
product that addresses that.”
•

“Every CENTCOM commander I think has struggled or grappled with this

(assessments) in the time I've been here.”
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•

“It (Design) was really not supportive of the type of decision-making that I've

seen evolve and necessary in CENTCOM to support the combatant commander's
decision-making process… I don't really see assessment addressed in there, clearly on
how it informs the operational approach.”
Additional supporting data for the Model Space is available in Appendix 1.3.
From this data, it also is possible to develop a recommended methodology for analyzing
the Operation Space. The inputs for the analysis of this space includes the operational approach
and the mission statement developed during the examination of the Model Space. The
operational design is the model from which to build an operational approach for the physical
environment within which the campaign will be executed.

Figure 1.14. Understanding the Operation Space.
Starting with the military objectives of the operational design, the designers develop
intermediate objectives that lead to achieving each objective for solving one of the complicated
problems developed through disaggregation of the complex problem. Once the complexity is
reduced to a number of less complex ones, designers organize military activity to accomplish the
series of intermediate military objectives by developing lines of effort focused on each
intermediate objective. As the activities become organized along the lines of effort, designers
then determine the timing and resources to accomplish the objectives and phase the campaign
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accordingly. Finally, it critical to identify national (policy) decision points that will control the
flow and execution of the military campaign over time under civilian control. The combination
of these steps results in the operational approach (See Figure 1.14).
Once the approach is complete, assessment criteria are developed tied to anticipated
changes in the operational environment. The two key outputs of the analysis of this space are the
operational approach and the assessment that will occur following execution of the campaign
that is developed during the MDMP. Due to the recursive nature of design, the assessment
provides the input required to start the re-evaluation of the problem-statement, Theory of Victory
and the model built to reflect the operational design.
The Dynamic-Recursive Military Design Model
The final result is a model that depicts the flow and inter-relationships of the various
aspects of military design based on two decades of war as experienced by those charged with
solving the national problems that led to them in the first place. Updating the model to reflect
the evaluation discussed in section 4.3 of this article, Figure 1.15 reflects the proposed design
methodology for the Department.

Figure 1.15. The Dynamic-Recursive Military Design Model.
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Confirming Design Challenges and Identifying Representative Artifacts of the
Model During Implementation
The second and third articles of this dissertation identify real-world examples of the
challenges and impromptu solutions created by two plans teams at USCENTCOM using current
DOD design processes in practice. Case research was conducted to capture the challenges of
applying military design and the artifacts created in response to those challenges. The first plans
team examined the problem of Great Power Competition currently ongoing globally between the
United States, Russia and China. The second plans team examined the problem caused by
having limited resources to achieve strategic objectives and the associated concept of Multistakeholder Coopetition. The data from these case studies confirmed some of the observations
and recommendations of the Plans Chiefs that were used to develop the MDM. As these articles
provide a more in-depth explanation of the design efforts, this brief overview is provided
describing the challenges and products by design space to examine the current military design
process during implementation.
Within the Problem Space, an artifact from the first case study provided an example of
developing the strategic context. The team was having trouble defining exactly what the term
‘competition short of armed conflict’ actually means. To explain the team’s findings, they
developed a model of the competitive space and its relationship to conflict by placing these
concepts within a strategic context. The second planning team also had trouble defining exactly
how to pool resources among four stakeholders to accomplish similar yet undefined objectives
due to the lack of written mandate. Therefore, the team developed a written ‘Terms of
Reference’ to define exactly what the collaborative effort would accomplish and placed their
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planning efforts within a strategic context of what needed to be accomplished through
collaboration as well as why.
Within the Solution Space, the second planning team was having difficulty agreeing on
areas of common interest to develop common goals for collaboration. The team eventually
identified facts and accompanying assumptions to infer common goals in the absence of higher
guidance. This abductive method was captured in the data as the reasoning process most useful
to develop the goals and became the basis for a theory to justify the recommended goals to the
combined leadership of the four organizations as described by the MDM.
Within the Modeling Space, the plans team for the first case study found themselves
trying to develop courses of action for competing below the level of armed conflict. In order to
derive methods for the employment of military resources within the competitive space, the plans
team created a model from which they could develop approaches to competition using an Ends –
Ways – Means paradigm (Lykke, 1997). Using this model within what the MDM describes as
the Model Space, the team eventually developed four distinct competitive approaches for
conducting competitive activities.
Finally, the second design team developed a method to assess the impact of the
collaborative efforts within the Operational Space. This artifact entailed a system for framing an
assessment of identified trends affecting the Problem Space based on current operations in the
Operational Space. Although there were challenges in developing common criteria among the
four stakeholders for the assessment, the artifact provided a useful framework for assessing the
impact of a campaign on the operational environment and associated changes to the Problem
Space as prescribed by the MDM.
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Evaluating the Model
A survey using evaluation criteria developed from the data was given to a focus group of
made up of five of the Plans Chiefs to review the recommendations of the MDM and compare
this new, dynamic recursive model to two of the most recent versions of the DOD design
processes – one from the Joint Staff as of 2017 and the other from the Army reflecting the
updated Army Design Methodology in 2019. Following discussions with the Plans Chiefs, the
MDM was updated to reflect the pertinent changes required to resolve the issues these subject
matter experts identified concerning the MDM. The four criteria used to evaluate each process
were:
1. Understandable – the concepts of the military design model and associated
methodology are comprehensively, universally, and easily understood among the
planners across the joint force.
2. Explainable – the model is straightforward thereby ensuring the strategic
conversation resulting from the design of the campaign is not overly complex for senior
leaders to understand and use in their discussions.
3. Assessable – the model enables an assessment of the operational environment (not
the campaign) exposing emerging problems or opportunities in the changing environment
to support decision-making and validate or reject the current solution to the problem
(TOV).
4. Flexible – the model is recursive and enables rapid modifications to the campaign
through constant analysis resulting in timely decisions and required adjustments caused
by the changing operational environment.
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On a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the best, each design process was rated, and the scores
were averaged for each criterion by process. Following completion of the surveys, each Plans
Chief was given the opportunity to explain their rationale for each score and provide any
recommendations or observations concerning the proposed MDM. The MDM was then updated
to reflect valid changes from the Plans Chiefs – most of which involved changes that added
clarity to the model. Figure 1.16 shows the results of the survey.

Figure 1.16. Evaluation Results of the Three Design Models Using a 10-Point Scale.
See Appendix 1.4 for a copy of the survey and associated design processes with
descriptions of each.
Observations from the Subject Matter Experts and Modifications to the MDM
A question was raised concerning when the designers had touchpoints with the
Commander to discuss the work to date and get feedback and guidance from the Commander.
The modification suggests three touchpoints: 1) An initial touchpoint to discuss the Problem
Space and Solution Space, 2) a second touchpoint once the model for the campaign was
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developed with an associated operational design, and 3) a final touchpoint that examined the
Operational Approach for the campaign.
There was a question regarding the impact of other actors operating within operational
environment. The initial MDM included “interagency partners” as part of the Solution Space.
However, after discussion the model was adjusted to reflect “other actors” as there will be many
international and non-governmental organizations operating in the environment (to include other
antagonists) whose activities must be considered when determining a solution.
The original model labeled the space where design occurs at “Modeling Space” and it
was pointed out that the term modeling had several negative connotations due to the military
definition of the modeling function and time involved to conduct modeling. The MDM was
adjusted to reflect nouns for each space and, subsequently, ‘Modeling’ was changed to ‘Model’
Space and “Operational’ was changed to “Operation’ Space.
Discussion
Advantages of the New Model
There are four major advantages of the MDM over the two extant military design models
(i.e. the Joint Planning model and the Army Design Methodology). The first is the creation of a
separate Solution Space within the design process that uses inferences based on the facts and
strategic context uncovered during the analysis of the Problem Space. As opposed to current
process that define the problem as the core issue preventing the current environment from
becoming a desired future environment, the MDM bases a problem on critical events occurring in
the current environment that affect attaining or maintaining defined national goals normally in the
form of policy objectives based on fact.
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The challenge of senior leaders to define desired ends thus placing them in a politically
constrained ‘box’ was prevalent over the last two decades of war in the USCENTCOM Area of
Responsibility. Therefore, tying the problem definition to a normally undefined end is futile and
because the problem is not based on a solid foundation, the solution developed becomes less viable
over time. However, developing a hypothesis based on abductive reasoning as a basis for a Theory
of Victory creates a more easily understood and achievable set of success criteria. Testing that
hypothesis through the prosecution of a campaign allows for a recursive examination of both the
problem and theory underwriting the current campaign thereby enabling meaningful and timely
decisions by senior leaders to adjust the campaign due to evolving dynamics within the Problem
Space. Simply defining a problem based on a rough comparison of where we are vs. where we
would like to be divorces the logic of the campaign from the science of design and leaves it in the
realm of hope, and hope is never a sound military method.
The second advantage of the MDM is the designation of a Model Space where the
Theory of Victory is translated into a conceptual scheme of how the conflict will play out in
time. Because of the inherent predictive nature of models, an operational design is developed
that enables a senior level discussion of how military action will likely play out over time
revealing associated military and political risk along with corresponding national objectives that
drive military action. If war is truly “the continuation of politics by other means,” (Clausewitz,
1824) then merging these two often conflicting risk assessments within a model that explains the
context of a current crisis and leads to the development of campaign that achieves military
objectives required for producing the desired political ends. This model enables designers to
predict the relative success of the artifact once implemented in the operation (physical) space.
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The third advantage of the MDM is the shift in assessment form assessing the campaign
in the Operation Space to assessing the current state of the problem in the Problem Space.
Nineteen years in Afghanistan and 14 years in Iraq conducting mostly the same type of
operations to achieve the same objectives designed to solve a problem defined 19- or 14-yearsago, respectively, is problematic. Combining those assessments with the scientific rigor of
Action Design Research to logically analyze the artifact (i.e. the Campaign or solution) in
relation to the problem differentiates the MDM from current Department design processes.
Different metrics must be examined as originally defined by the strategic context of the Problem
Space so decisions can be presented to senior policy makers regarding next steps for the military
operation thus updating the goals and objectives for the evolved problem and then update the
solution.
The final advantage of the MDM is the use of Design Science as part of the system for
solving complex, ill-structured problems faced by the nation today. During wars of the last
century, there was a great amount of emphasis on the tactics and science of war to develop
battleplans for the defeat of an enemy on the battlefield. As the U.S. military transitioned from
Air-Land Battle and similar operational constructs to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and
then to counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, plans became more
conceptual through the use of lines of effort and away from the sciences involving physics and
geographic space using lines of operation to drive military action. As plans became more and
more conceptual in nature, details were lost and the ability to synchronize military activity in
time, space and purpose was increasingly difficult. The MDM uses the principles of Design
Science Research to help guide the development and adjustment to the solution and adds rigor to
the analysis required for any successful military campaign.
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These four advantages support both the art and science of war by incorporating the ‘art’
of design though design theory and the ‘science’ of design through Design Science.
Collectively, Design Thinking helps the problem-solving practitioner through the process
described by the MDM.
Broader Implications
To modify current Design doctrine based on the proposed Design Thinking approaches to
solve practical problems, the following conclusions summarize the additional aspects this
research uncovered for Design Thinking that supports the broader problem-solving community
and its practitioners. These observations provide insight from the study of military design
practices within the DOD to generalize the military application for the broader design academic
community:
1. Design Thinking focuses on developing an ‘appreciation’ of the environment they
are trying to change to solve a problem using divergent thinking (perceptions) instead of
immediately developing a solution based on the logic associated defining the operational
environment as a closed system using convergent thinking (fixed positions).
2. Design Thinking is based upon Abductive reasoning; a series of observations
(facts and assumptions) leading to an inference. Inference becomes the basis for the
hypothesis needed to articulate a Theory of Victory within the Solution Space.
3. As designers develop artifacts, they seek to eliminate impossible solutions in
favor of improbable solutions that are modified over time.
4. Design Thinking enables a problem solver to identify potential solutions to the
current problem, implement a potential solution while understanding that merely
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implementing the solution will change the environment and, by default, the nature of the
problem itself.
5. Design Science enables the practitioner to evaluate the impact of the solution on
the future environment (what has changed) and anticipate the range of future outcomes
and associated emergent problems.
Design theory is grounded in abductive reasoning. As opposed to inductive reasoning
that begins with an initial observation or inference that expands into a theory, abductive
reasoning provides the evidence that creates the initial observation required to create a
hypothesis as the basis of a theory (i.e. the Theory of Victory). The theory is then tested through
the introduction of an artifact into the operational space using assessments to prove or disprove
the theory based on hypothesis testing.
In order to create the artifact to modify the natural world in an effort to solve a problem, a
design approach must come to ‘appreciate’ the operational environment over time. Most
problem solvers begin their efforts by developing an understanding. However, with open
systems it is impossible to develop a coherent understanding of the relationships between the
various dynamics at work within the system (Rittel & Webber, 1973). But an initial appreciation
can be comprised of a basic understanding of these dynamics based on a combination of facts
and assumptions. As effort is applied to act upon the environment, learning takes place that
enables the problem-solver to further appreciate the factors at work within the system and, more
importantly, what is and is not working and affected by the introduction of an artifact within the
system. These observations lead to inferences that are used to modify or update the hypothesis
that led to the creation of the success criteria the artifact was created to achieve.
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Finally, the design of the potential solution and its implementation will affect dynamics
that may not be fully understood or appreciated with the operational environment. Therefore,
Design Thinking accounts for the fact that the creation and implementation of a solution to the
Problem Space will result in unforeseen changes to the problem and the artifact (i.e. the solution)
will have to change to remain relevant in addressing the new or emerging problems that
inevitably occur within any open system. As the appreciation of both the Problem Space and
Solution Space increases, changes to the artifact are made based upon anticipated changes to the
dynamics within the operational space. The real value of Design Thinking, consisting of both
theory and science, involves the increased ability to anticipate emerging problems within the
operational space over time, thereby allowing leaders to get ahead of problems more efficiently.
A second generalization is recommended modifications to scientific method and the
underlying reasoning process that grounds the study of phenomena through scientific inquiry.
Because abduction, as previously explained, grounds Design Thinking in a reasoning process
distinct from inductive or deductive reasoning and focuses on generation of a hypothesis for
creating a model that eventually results in the development of an artifact to solve a problem, it
should be added to standard scientific methods. The use of abductive reasoning generates a
hypothesis that leads to experimentation using primarily quantitative methods to confirm or
reject the hypothesis using deductive reasoning. From this singular observation, inductive
reasoning creates a theory using qualitative methods that lead to the generation of additional
experiments to prove or disprove the theory. If the theory is disproved, the abductive process is
revisited because science has proven the truth behind the theory as impossible leading to the
development of alternative hypotheses for the truth, no matter how improbable that truth may
seem (Doyle, 1992).
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Figure 1.17 summarizes the inclusion of abduction in the cycle of research. Any new
theory starts with observations that are used to develop inferences based on the analysis of data,
corresponding facts and assumptions, and the subsequent hypothesis resulting from a synthesis
of the data. These inferences are more general and used to develop hypotheses routinely created
using qualitative research methods. As hypotheses are generated or refined, experiments are
conducted using quantitative methods and the hypothesis is proved or rejected using deductive
reasoning. Based on specific data, results are then generalized into theory using inductive
reasoning. If deductive reasoning provides observations that reject the inferences and resultant
hypothesis, these can then be fed back into the DSR process to modify a given artifact through
subsequent interventions by revisiting the assumptions of the Solution Space, developing new
inferences based on revised facts and assumptions and creating a new hypothesis for
experimentation.

Figure 1.17. Proposed Modification to Bhattacherjee’s Cycle of Research Model.
Limitations
There were several limitations regarding this exploratory, qualitative research. The first
two limitations involved those interviewed to collect the data and a third involved the process.
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The first limitation was the geographic region where the problem-solving process was used to
address emerging crises was confined to the Middle East. The Middle East differs from other
geographic locations such as Europe, Africa or the Far East. Although the MDM seems to be a
better fit for solving complex problems, there may be aspects or challenges that are particular to
certain geographic locations. For example, would the MDM be equally useful for solving
problems in the Homeland? Defense support to civil authorities during hurricanes or responding
to pandemic influenza present vastly different complex problems than terrorism or conventional
combat operations. Obtaining input from the Plans Chiefs responsible for Europe, the Pacific or
Homeland may provide additional adjustments to the model.
Second, each of the Plans Chiefs interviewed were from the Army. As was noted during
discussion of the Problem, the Marine Corps has a different system for design than the Army.
Interviewing Plans Chiefs that were from the other Services including the Navy and Air Force
may present unique challenges they face when planning operations in the maritime or air
domains. The research is valid for adjusting the Army Design Methodology as the subjects were
all soldiers and one of the extant models assess was the Army Design Methodology. But it does
not provide direct analysis of military design from a Joint perspective. Future research should
account for the differences in the respective Service planning doctrine and assess if the MDM
provides utility across the Joint Force.
Finally, this study is not binding on the Pentagon. Rather it is intended to inform a
discussion regarding integration of design into the current military problem-solving process. The
inability to direct the execution of the proposed design model created challenges in assessing the
utility of the Model. However, publication of this article in military journals will start a
professional conversation regarding practical application of design within the DOD. And
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although consensus is unlikely, understanding of Design Thinking will increase within and
among the Services regarding the direction Design Thinking will take within the Department and
its utility toward solving complex, ill-structured problems worldwide.
Implications for Practice and Future Research
Contributions
The contributions from this research can be consolidated into three distinct areas: 1) a
contribution to enhancing our understanding of the reasoning underlying scientific method, 2)
the development of a model for designing military campaigns that can be generalized to broader
design theory, research and practice, and 3) recommended modifications for plans organizations
within the DOD.
First, the research suggests abduction is a better reasoning system for designing an
artifact because at the heart of design is the evaluation of an artifact in practice with subsequent
modifications to the rationale that led to the development of the current artifact. Because this
form of reasoning uses inferences based on identified facts and assumptions to define success,
the evolution of an artifact is directly tied to the logical evolution of design that comes from the
artifact in practice and re-assessing our collective understanding of the known knowns (facts),
known unknowns (assumptions) and the unknown unknowns (inferences). Based on the analysis
of the data and resulting model for military design, a modification to the scientific method model
of the cycle of research is recommended.
Second, this study created a more useful model for executing military design that leads to
the current linear planning process or MDMP. Data supporting its greater utility was derived
from both observations of military design in practice as well as an evaluation by subject matter
experts. There are a couple of key reasons for this increased utility. In addition to the Problem
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Space and the Operational Space, the study identifies two additional design spaces required for
more effective military design. The model also identified interdependencies among the four
military ‘design spaces’ as explained in the Results section.
The model proposed a novel concept of developing a Theory of Victory within the
Solution Space that includes a hypothesis explaining why the use of military resource will
achieve the desired outcomes and why those outcomes will solve the problem defined in the
Problem Space. It also introduces the concept of operational design as a model of the proposed
artifact’s interaction with the operational environment and its predicted degree of relative success
and potential second and third order effects.
Through observations of current design efforts, the research also discovered ‘living’
products from practice (e.g. Strategic Context, Problem Statement, Theory of Victory) that
support the deliberate and crisis planning processes. These products derived and developed from
real-world design efforts corroborated some of the observations of the subject matter experts and
provided useful examples of ‘best practices’ for the Dynamic-Recursive Military Design Model.
A final contribution of the MDM was the requirement to broaden the orientation of
current military assessment doctrine for military campaigns to assessing the impact of the
Campaign on the Problem Space. Current assessments focus on whether an organization is
executing the campaign in a manner that is creating the intended effects on the operational
environment and if the actions of the organization to produce those effects are being performed
in the prescribed standard. This tells an organization if they are conducting the directed
operations of the campaign in an effective manner and if they performed their duties while
executing those operations well. What is not assessed is whether the campaign is solving the
problem. In other words, the organization may be executing the campaign in an outstanding
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fashion resulting in a positive assessment even though the campaign itself is not solving the
problem for which it was created. So, organizations continue to execute the campaign as planned
but expecting a different result; what some have defined as ‘insanity’.
As one Plans Chief said, “if you ask most military organizations what is Plan ‘B’? They
will often admit that Plan ‘B’ is to get back to Plan ‘A’ as quickly as possible.” Focusing the
assessment on the problem the campaign is supposed to solve instead of how well a unit is
executing the campaign in and of itself allows for more dynamic adjustments to the operational
design (the model developed in the Model Space) to address the evolving problem instead of
merely adjustments to the campaign to achieve directed objectives that may no longer be relevant
due to changes within the Problem Space.
The final area to which this study contributes is organizational structure. The research
shows that military design and planning occur in parallel and feed each other. However, the
Department’s planning structure for a senior staff is still organized using the Napoleonic model
of the 18th century which may no longer be valid for solving problems within the increasingly
complex operational environment of the 21st Century information age. The requirement for
continued Design Thinking, artifact refinement and assessment continue at a higher echelon of
understanding than the strictly operational execution of a military campaign. Currently, the
Department breaks its planning efforts into three different groups based on time horizons. The
first group of planners focus on “current operations” and tracking ‘what is’ to provide reports and
orders for tracking activity of subordinate units in the here and now. They write products for
execution within the current 24-hour period.
The next group of planners track “future operations” – operations that will occur within
the next 24 – 120 hours. Their main planning focus is on ‘what if’ and they write plans directing
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action in the event of unexpected adversary action to get the campaign back on track. The final
group of planners track “future plans” looking at “what’s next” – typically defined as the next
phase of an operation or campaign. This type of planning is tied to assessments and creates
products for execution on a timeline greater than 120 hours.
The question is that because the doctrine divides the plans teams into three groups of
Current Operations – Future Operations – Future Plans and places the two teams focused on
Operations in the Operations Directorate and the one team focused on Plans in the Strategy and
Plans Directorate, is there a requirement for a plans team in this directorate focused on “Current
Plans”? If so, this may be the design team that focuses on the design activities of the MDM for
campaigns in execution as well as developing campaign design for the planners on the Future
Plans team. The Department separates planners by time, so the staff does not get sucked into the
current fight and maintains some planning bandwidth in anticipation of future crises. Perhaps
carving out a Design Team would keep the command focused on the problems they are trying to
solve with their campaigns instead of focused almost exclusively on the execution of current
campaigns and the challenges associated with that execution in real time.
Future Research
Because this exploratory research established a model for understanding and applying
design within the military, the areas for future research should focus on each space within the
proposed design process. Within the Problem Space, future research should examine the
components of creating the Strategic Context beyond what is recommended in this study.
Determining how to identify relevant changes to the Problem Space and its impact on both the
strategic context and problem statement is another. Finally, it would be helpful to understand
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how a designer properly articulates a problem statement. What separates a proper problem
statement from an inadequate or useless one?
Within the Solution Space, more research can be done on abduction and the relationship
of inference as a basis for a possible solution. As inference leads to a hypothesis that is used to
develop a Theory of Victory, what comprises a valid Theory of Victory? Defining and the
refining over time the Theory of Victory may enable the Department to finish a military
campaign more quickly and efficiently thus reducing the risk of becoming embroiled in a conflict
for decades (e.g. Afghanistan).
Within the Modeling Space more research needs to be done on the components of a
model that describes the Operational Design for developing a campaign. There are already very
detailed and structured methods for deriving a mission statement. But translating the Theory of
Victory through an operational design that enables military activity within Operational Space is
still immature.
Finally, within the Operational Space, the concept of ‘disaggregating’ complexity into a
number of complicated or medium-structured problems is worthy of future research. Both
Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory describe the risks and challenges associated with taking
action to solve complex problems. Breaking the complexity into more manageable pieces that
become the focus of the Lines of Operation within the military campaign as a recommended
solution to address these challenges and the process of ‘disaggregation’ is still undefined.
Conversely, how does the designer ‘reaggregate’ the distinct actions of the campaign to identify
changes to and impact of the campaign on the complex operational environment to identify
emerging risks or exploit new opportunities? Much research can be done to examine the
transition from MDM to MDMP and the execution of the campaign within the physical space.
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Appendix 1.1: Research Design
Table 1.1A. Development of Initial Research Questions.
What do I need to know?
(Research Question)
1. What are the common
challenges among the lived
experiences of senior Plans
Chiefs when solving
wicked problems?

Why do I need to know
this?
Need to define the current
use of 'Design' in military
problem solving by
examining two key
components according to
current DOD doctrine:
'Framing the Operational
Environment' and
'Framing the Problem'

What kind of data will
answer these questions?
Will be determined from
interviews

2. How does design theory
and Design Science
Research support the
problem-solving process?

Need to define the current
use of 'Design' in business
and academic research
and potential applicability
to military problemsolving

Will be determined
through a combination of
interviews and literature
review

*The use of inferences
developed from abductive
reasoning enables theory
framing.
*Divergent thinking is used
in design to develop novel
solutions to the defined
problem.
*Convergent thinking is used
to develop courses of action
for Joint Force.

3. What artifact (process)
best enables design
approaches to support
problem solving?

Need identify the
appropriate use of design
in the current military
problem-solving process.

Will be determined
through a combination of
interviews and case
studies

*An iterative planning
process enables solving
wicked problems by making
measured adjustments to the
operational environment
over time and making
improvements to those
adjustments as understanding
of the problem increases.
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Potential Conclusions
*Therefore, the process
develops solutions that solve
the wrong problem.
*Therefore, the end provided
by the solution is
unachievable or creates a
subsequent unacceptable
operational environment.

Appendix 1.2: Deriving Interview Questions from the Research Questions
Table 1.2A. Interview Questions to Research Question Linkage.
Research Objective: To integrate Design Thinking into the DOD planning process in order to develop the optimum problem-solving artifact
(process) for complex or ‘wicked’ problems.
Research Question
1. What are common
challenges among the
lived experiences of
senior Plans Chiefs when
solving wicked problems?

Hypothesis
1.1 Current military
problem-solving
approaches (IV) do not
adequately define
complex problems
(DV).

1.2 Current military
strategic problemsolving processes (IV)
develop
unrealistic/unachievable
solutions or courses of
action (DV)?

2. How does design
theory and design science
research support the
problem-solving process?

2.1 Abduction (IV) is
the proper reasoning
process for interpreting
data derived from design
science research (DV).

Potential Conclusion
Therefore, the process
develops solutions that
solve the wrong
problem.

Therefore, the end
provided by the solution
is unachievable or
creates a subsequent
unacceptable operational
environment.

The use of inferences
developed from
abductive reasoning
enabled theory framing.
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Interview Question
1a. Can you describe at
least 2 of the largest
problems you had to
address during your time
as the CENTCOM plans
chief’?
1b. How did your
planners define the
problem that needed to
be solved?
1c. What are some
examples where you
experienced a
breakdown in the
planning methodology?
1d. How would you
describe the
methodology used by
your planners to frame
the problem?
2a. Provide an example
from your lived
experience where the
product or solution
provided did not meet
the expectations of our
National Leadership?
2b. Please explain what
products created by the
National Leadership
found most useful &
why?
2c. How much design
methodology did
planners use to create
solutions to problems
and did you find that
effective?
2d. Can you provide
some examples of
design products you
found useful or
unuseful?
2e. Can you provide
some examples or
stories of your team
assessed changes in the
operational
environment?
3a. During mission
analysis, planners
identify facts and
assumptions. Do you see
a role for inference?

Follow on Questions

Was it accurate and if not,
why?

Reflecting on that
process, what needs to
change to make it more
effective?
Why did or didn’t it meet
expectations?
How would you correct or
improve the
product/solution?

Reflecting back on the
products your team
developed, what was
missing?

Is distinguishing between
assumptions and
assessments useful (as
proposed by GEN
Petreaus)?

Table 1.2A (Continued)
Research Question

3. What artifact (process)
best enables design
approaches to support
problem solving?

Hypothesis

Potential Conclusion

2.2 Design theory (IV)
enables divergent
thinking (MV) which
more effectively
supports the
development of relevant
solutions for solving
problems (DV).

Divergent thinking is
used in design to
develop novel solutions
to the defined problem.
Convergent thinking is
used to develop courses
of action for Joint Force.

3.1 Design’s iterative
approach is most helpful
in developing achievable
goals.

An iterative planning
process enables solving
wicked problems by
making measured
adjustments.

3.2 Establishing a series
of NEXSTATES
(Mediating Variable)
best enables ‘dynamic’
problem-solving.

Interview Question
3b. Our war colleges
discuss the concept of a
Theory of Victory or
Theory of the Case,
however, these theories
are not used in the Joint
Operational Planning
Process (JOPP). How
well did the planning
effort define success for
the two challenges you
faced?
4a. How would you
describe the relationship
between the operation
design and course of
action development?
4b. Operational Art has
been defined as Ends –
Ways – Means. Strategy
has also been defined as
balancing Ends – Ways
– Means (Lykke. 1997).
How do you see the
difference between
Operational Art and
Strategy?
5a. How well did your
planners understand the
role of design in
planning?

Follow on Questions

From your experience,
did your planners make a
distinction between the
two?
How effectively do you
develop and execute a
strategy as part of
planning?

5b. How do you think
design can best improve
the planning process?

5c. How well does the
current process adapt
planned actions to
respond to changes in
the operational
environment?
5d. What decision
support tools or products
need to be updated or
created to improve our
ability to manage
complex problems?
Final Thoughts
6. Why is or isn’t design useful to DOD problemsolving?
7. Is there any other aspect of design and planning that
needs to be addressed?
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Appendix 1.3: Codes Used to Develop the Recommended Model
PART A. DESCRIPTION. The methodology used to create the outputs for each Space (e.g.
Problem Space, Solution Space, etc.) of the MDM is based on codes from the qualitative
research and subsequent themes derived from the Analysis. Relevant codes by Space are:
1. PROBLEM SPACE: Diagnose (Comments from 88% of the sampling)
•

“That was probably a reflection of both our understanding of the problem and the
actual environment itself evolving over time. Because I think after the fall of the
regime, there probably were some former regime elements who are motivated by
trying to restore the regime. But over time even people who had formerly members of
the regime, their goal was no longer to restore the regime.”

•

It's a very complex problem. So what we tried to do was build a depiction… we
designed, we built a framework in appreciation of what we thought the problem was.
And I use "appreciation” … because appreciation means an understanding within a
context.”

•

There's the political objective that does not support our military objectives or our
military operations, and actually that's the wrong way. What we are doing militarily is
not part of the political objectives. So, it becomes untenable when the political
decider determines that the military objectives are not accomplishing his political
goals, and he's not willing to change his political goals. So the military objectives
have to change. And that case and point can be taken back to probably the days of
McNamara and Johnson taken back to McCarthy and Truman, that's requirement for
alignment of the military objectives to achieve the political objectives.
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•

In many cases you were already given the problem and it wasn't your job to go back
and further figure out what problem had been given to you solve, nor a lot of
tolerance to go back and say, "What I think he meant was this..."

•

What design brings and if it's followed is something that might have prevented six to
eight weeks of intense planning and absorption by the leadership on a problem that
really wasn't there -- as an example.

•

I think what the MDMP did not allow for upfront the proper definition of a problem.
You were presented with a set of problems without going through and defining it to
make sure that the follow through was there. The act of defining the problem upfront,
which I think these design frameworks do to a much better degree, was never parked
in my mind of the MDMP process, nor was any tolerance because you had to turn
slides so quickly that even the MDMP process wasn't supportable in the tight
timelines. So the process broke down almost immediately and you have to rely on
evolving information that came in from all directions to try to inform that.

•

I don't think we ever did take a proper look at the problem, try to figure out what you
are trying to solve in the long run, and really go through the design steps.

•

And I can say that easily now looking backwards. I don't know if I could say that
back then, because just too busy with, how do I fix what's in front of me now,
because the problem seems to just keep growing.

•

An estimate is against something that you sort of already understand. You do an
estimate against a model you understand. An appreciation is actually helping you
design the model that you want to operate against. And so what we did was take their
guidance, which had a bias built into it. It had a bias built into it by the way it was
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written. It presumed that your opponent looked and operated a certain way. So it
presumed that. And so what we did was divorce ourselves from that and we went over
and took all the facts.
•

Some people forget or don't focus on the essential element of what is the problem that
you're trying to solve. Because if you don't properly identify the problem, you're
going to go down a path that leads you to an end-state that doesn't achieve what
you're trying to get at. So I would say defining the problem was an iterative process
of discussion and analysis at the planner, div chief, director and commander level,
which was all informed at multiple echelon within the headquarters based on lived
experience and understanding of operational art.

•

But initially, we could not help the commander identify the future state that we were
trying to achieve, which meant we never identified the problem we were trying to
solve. And we spent the initial portion of the fight against ISIS tactically fighting ISIS
to regain control of Iraq. But that wasn't the desired future state. That was the
intermediate state.

•

This is the crux of the planning problem. To me, now I'll give you a conjecture, this is
why design was introduced. Because, if you solve the wrong problem, you still solve
nothing. So part of what we owe as the planners, especially as a level of complexity
gets more intense, is to help the commanders solve the right problem. It's really,
really hard to get a military commander to define a future state when the Pentagon
refuses to define that state for him.
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•

I think the problem evolved because the environment in which the problem was
working within changed. And that's one of the things that I'm not sure that design
fully takes account of, is the changing environment.

2. SOLUTION SPACE: Define (comments from 88% of the sampling)
•

So you frame it. Your framing is a hypothesis. Because when you frame the problem
and you look at it and you say, I think it works this way. And then the next thing you
have to do--look at all the other parts of the system, which may offer opportunity, or
actually redefine the problem.

•

I noticed now after a few years that the end states that are defined for you are often
politically described and driven as a broad sort of desired end state that we want to go
to. Practically when you start considering what you can actually achieve and what
you may want to achieve as success to meet the political desired description are quite
different.

•

What was defined as ‘success’ kept changing. If you're changing the goal, it's very
hard to have a plan to achieve the goal. And if you're changing the goal, you can
continue changing what success looks like. I mean, just a myriad of decisions that
were made, even just related to Iraq that made it almost impossible to be thinking
about where we are going with this.

•

Honestly, if you asked somebody at OSD policy in 2004 or 2005, what does success
look like, I mean, the answer would be, well, what do you mean?

•

The politics of planning in the headquarters at that time, you had to compromise a lot
to get to what you wanted. So you couldn't be a purist or a stormtroopers and say,
"Hey, this is the right strategy." You had to bend and maybe not have what you
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personally thought was the most optimal solution. [the need to continually reassess
your Theory of Victory.]
•

Better OPTs they'll revisit those, they'll have a disciplined systematic way of
revisiting facts and assumptions at each step of the process to update those and say,
okay. We did mission analysis, we came up with these facts and assumptions. Now
we've done COA Development but we've identified some new facts and assumptions
on there. But a lot of times I think that because there's not a spot for inferences, that
we take something that might be an inference and label it as an assumption.

•

So doctrinally we treat planning assumptions as things that we need to address in
order to complete the plan. And then every assumption becomes a commander's
decision point and a contingency plan. So, "If this assumption proves false, then I
need to execute contingency plan one because..." And for a very tactical, linear fight,
that works. But as you increase in the level of complexity, you have to make more
what we would call assumptions. But those assumptions aren't always going to lead to
contingency plans or commander's decision points. So I think there's a gap in doctrine
to address the unknowns in a complex environment that a planner needs to address
and say, "We need to account for this. This is part of our current operating
environment. Or this is part of our current problem. I don't need a commander's
decision point for this. But it's just based on the level of complexity and the problem
I'm trying to solve, we just don't know this."

•

There needs to be something else that says... And I don't know what we call it. I don't
know if it's planning. I called it planning considerations, right? It's not an assumption.
But it's planning consideration. And the more we develop information, the more we'll
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be able to say, "All right. That's no longer a consideration, that's a fact. I think there's
a gap in doctrine right now at the more complex level of planning for the things that
are not known, that are not doctrinal assumptions.
•

We’re doing a war plan development and we start from, this is our current
environment, this is what the fight is going to be. We have to identify one or two
reasons why we got Casus Belli and why we're going to war, and each one of those
two are going to drive us down to specific outcomes, and what are our national
interests, what we're trying to do.

3. MODEL SPACE: Design (comments from 63% of the sampling)
•

So one of the things he (Friedman) postulates is do three things if you want to be
successful. You've got to realize three things. You've got to understand that operating
in the box-- that's the frame that you understand, you're in the box-- you're going to
have to do that because that's what you’re about to do right now. You're going to have
to operate outside the box, because you want to be outside, doing things other people
don't understand. And then, frankly, you want to be operating without a box, that
nobody else can actually imagine where you are.

•

So I'll tell you what I tell everybody. I'm just trying to be as unwrong as I can. No, I'm
serious. I'm trying to be as unwrong as I can so that I can close the gap faster once I
get there. Because if I make the wrong turn too early, I can never get back. So my
presumption is we will never be right. I just want to be close so I can learn my way
into where I got to be.

•

But maybe the real creativity is coming up with a different way to display information
that you can make, lay out the logic of how to do this for the commander. So the
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commander can understand that. Because some of it's kind of like it's the old joke of,
if all you have is a hammer, every problem is a nail. And so if all you have are
objectives and lines of effort, lines of operation, then you keep applying that to
something that maybe that's not the best way to visually represent what the system is
that you're trying to affect. But maybe the real creativity is coming up with a different
way to display information that you can make, lay out the logic of how to do this for
the commander. So the commander can understand that. Because some of it's kind of
like it's the old joke of, if all you have is a hammer, every problem is a nail. And so if
all you have are objectives and lines of effort, lines of operation, then you keep
applying that to something that maybe that's not the best way to visually represent
what the system is that you're trying to affect.
•

I know intuitively that this conceptual design is a great way to inform the process, the
linear process.

•

So I think complexity changes this idea of this nice clean end state that people like to
have. But you still try to create one at least for how one operation may transition to
another. I think that one of the things we don't do very well is have sequels.

•

I think that because we keep talking about the world is more complex, and the
problems are more complex, and we do more stuff... we don't fight on our own
anymore much. It's always with coalitions. One, we're usually with partners. But two,
we're not doing an awful lot in one agency anymore. Very rarely big, broad stuff do
we do. It might be a DOD-led effort or a DOD supported effort, but it's usually a
bunch of other organizations. And where I'm going with this is, I think that
operational design and coming up with an operational approach is a very useful tool.
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And it should be better understood and utilized by a much broader set of people than
currently go about it.
4. OPERATION SPACE: Disaggregate (comments from 88% of the sampling)
a. Assessing the changing environment:
•

Where are we in the storyline? …the story has been going on for a dozen years, and
he's having to figure out where he's at in the storyline, and so that's shifting. So the
arc that we're on changes, and where (the Commander’s) focus is on X with intensity
unseen of in the previous three years changes, where do we stand, and what is
acceptable and what's not acceptable? So the constant, the campaign over time with
the change to planners (and leaders) is a huge challenge, so how do you maintain that
continuity or consistency of understanding the problem?

•

If the leaders aren't connecting some form of assessment to the product and
considering that or the planners aren't making that link visible, that assessment
quickly gets left behind as part of the process.

•

It was really not supportive of the type of decision making that I've seen evolve and
necessary in CENTCOM to support the combatant commander's decision making
process. Somehow or another if you look at the difference between the 2011 design, I
don't really see assessment addressed in there, clearly on how it informs the
operational approach.

•

Every CENTCOM commander I think has struggled or grappled with this
(assessments) in the time I've been here.

•

I want future's based assessments. So I want an assessment of the future. Now those
assessment and estimate is there's obviously a lot of overlap in the meaning of those
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words. And so not to be overly pedantic, but the assessment is in the rear view mirror.
It's you assess something that's already happened. So it has to have been in the past.
An estimate is something about, is something in the future.
•

All we ever got was a whole list of components directing, "Do this." And then the
assessment was, "Did you do this?” Well, I was trying to drive it to, “I don't care if
you did this, I care about ‘Did you achieve what we wanted you to achieve by doing
this’?” And more importantly, “did that then lead to this." But if we just had disparate
directions to a component, which we did, then whatever actions we were assessing,
we were just assessing the actions themselves and not the meaning of the action.

•

What I was trying to do is, "Let's get past the tasks. Let's get past that initial result and
let's get to, what objective is all of this leading us to? Then we can really assess. Not
only are we doing what we said we're doing and not only is what we're doing
generating the result that we want, but is that result leading us in the direction that we
want to go?"

b. Disaggregate:
•

So, if you ever get to a point where you try to have a product that addresses the
complete complexity of a problem, it just overwhelms everybody, takes too long,
there's too much discussion, you almost have to break it down in baby steps and
inform the complexity, bring it back into planning, then try to have a product that
addresses that...

•

I think it depends, say, for example, if it's ill-defined, you're going to have a tough
time using a structured linear approach. So therefore, using part of the logic and
reasoning, so therefore if you come to a point where it's a well-defined understood
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problem, you could go to a linear approach, up until then you probably want to
leverage the conceptual approach until you can get to that point.
•

As soon as you stick your finger in the problem, it's not the same problem. As soon as
you begin to examine the problem, it actually redefines itself because it's not what it
was just because you put your intellect into it, this whole flames on a wall shit kind of
thing. What I think what it begs is that there's not a finality. And what you need to
understand is that what you're always doing is you're always designing. You're
always operating to learn so that you can increase your design, so that the next time
you put something out when you want to take action, that you will have a more
relevant insertion of energy into the system so that you can exploit the opportunities
that you seek. I mean, so it's a continuous.

•

We would assess it in terms of risk and say, "Look, we need to get at this problem, we
know the other problem exists because of this, however, let's think through this first,
see where we are and then figure out how that affects the other piece."

c. Approach:
•

Operational approach is your general creative thinking approach to help you
understand and frame it problem-framing or, and then once you, I think, can capture
the essence of that and you can get your hands around it, then you go into more of a
linear approach to help you go through a deliberate process that gets you to building a
product.

•

There’s really two things here, design and then the linear approach. We need to guard
against taking an overly structured linear approach and ignore any elements of design
that could inform that process. I think as we had to iteratively adjust plans for Iraq
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draw-down, Syria, defense of Jordan, WMD strikes, et cetera, the environment was
changing so rapidly, the issues were complex, we constantly talked about the wicked
problems - that which can't be solved without creating another problem. So therefore,
we relied on design to think through - on an iterative basis - what we had to get at and
then we would go into a more of a strict linear approach at mission analysis options in
order to provide BMA to national-level leadership.
•

So you're kind of managing the conflict as opposed to coming to some definitive end
state. Maybe we are too deterministic and say, "We've got to have a clear end state."
And maybe we blame Powell for that. And, "What is our exit strategy?" Well, maybe
the exit strategy is a little bit more amorphous than you'd like it to be.

PART B. DESCRIPTION. The codes used to develop the evaluation criteria that the focus
group will use to evaluate the proposed Military Design Model (e.g. Understandable,
Explainable, etc.) and compare it to current design models within the DOD. Relevant codes by
Criteria are:
1. UNDERSTANDABLE: (comments from 75% of the sampling) A process that is
understood by both the plans staff and commander; one that is not too complicated for
common understanding nor too general leading to unproductive or simplistic analysis.
•

But what it can inform is information that is provided to the commander in whatever
way is acceptable to him, his comfort zone. He may not actually embrace operational
design, but operational design can provide a framework as it said here, or an OPT or a
group of planners to come together and address specific things, develop a process to
present information to the commander.
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•

But if the planner cannot articulate his product to the commander because it sounds
more like astrophysics, then the commander's not going to use it.

•

We need to avoid from being overly simplistic with a checklist and linear design
because it does not allow us to be agile with planning. The design, in framing, does
not allow us to get to a level of detail that the linear planning does. So therefore, I
think there is a symbiotic relationship between those two that can be iterative.

•

Most people don't have a clue of what you're talking about right now. And the other
part don't care. And because they don't understand it and don't believe in it, that's a
challenge in itself right off the bat.

•

I think design is very useful, in fact as I said, if we'd had some elements of design
(back then) and it was supported, which is always the key thing, then we could have,
by defining the problem upfront, made sure we are on a path that was well understood
by leadership upfront and agreed to, so that we could move out instead of constantly
going down. So, you constantly were in that do-loop of bringing products back to
initiation or at least revisiting the initiation.

•

I don't think they're very well structured. The design process. And I don't think our
application of it is.

•

How do you use it (Design)? When do you use it? But I do think we haven't tapped
the full potential of it. And I think the reason why we haven't is because I don't think
enough people in the headquarters really understand it.

•

I believe the problem is they have made it too complex, and it takes a lot of people, a
lot of effort, and a lot of mental effort and a lot of brain cells to get their head
wrapped around design, because when we first listened to talk about design going
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back 10 years ago, 12 years ago, whenever it was, it really was just painful to listen to
it.
•

But as you and I are having a discussion and we've gotten used to it and utilizing it,
we've become practitioners of design, and are able to apply it to things that we want
to do to accomplish things that are a little bit more challenging. Design becomes a
very effective tool. I would say for the department of defense, it is an indispensable
tool in the toolbox. However, it cannot be the sole tool. And quite often similar to
many other tools that are in the toolbox, you can't use it by itself.

•

Even if Department of Defense becomes the king of design and uses it as a very
common practice, if we're working with a bunch of other agencies that think it's a
waste of time, and they don't understand it and they don't want to get involved in the
part up front, then it's never going to have the effectiveness that it should.

•

We’re kind of all over the map when it comes to this. Okay. Somehow we need to
standardize something and say, "Okay, we have a doctrine,"

•

The problem with the design as opposed to the process that we came with the MDMP
process, is a lack of clarity on time and products. When do you stop and do touch
points? When do you do that now? That may be outlined in more detail in the design
stuff, but it's a less structured process, so for an old dog, I knew the MDMP and
you're supposed to stop here, seek guidance, present information, get concurrence.

2. EXPLAINABLE: (comments from 88% of the sampling) Enabling a strategic level
conversation about what needs to be done and why.
•

Answering strategic level questions in the slide, very few slides, very strategic in
nature and this was a learning lesson for planners. "I don't need to know how the
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watch was built. I don't need to know how you raise the pig. Just show me the bacon."
The product that you produce needed to facilitate a dialogue on key issues only
between the Commander and the SecDef or the commander and the Chairman and
anything else on the slide that could provide a distraction or a focus for discussion
outside the key issues, shouldn't have gone on that slide, because it just represented
an issue that would take us off track.
•

I think planners try to say, "No, this the process, this is how we presented this," and it
may not be a comfort zone for the commander to accept that that way or to foster a
discussion between the senior leader and another senior leader.

•

The simpler you can make a graph or something to describe a complex issue, the
better off that you are. And to this day, I still like the charts that have very simple,
practical things on them.

•

One of the problems with PowerPoint in our Army is people try too hard to take
complex issues and make them show how well they can describe the complex issue in
a slide. Whereas, what we really should be focused on is how to make a very complex
issue simple. And that's the whole purpose of doing it. A minimum amount of
information that people could digest.

•

Simplicity and repetition were the keys to actually getting somewhere. By telling
them the same thing over and over again. . And it also was smart, because it
reinforced that you're not doing your job. I'm doing my job.

•

That might be invalid, that could very well be invalid. But until you force people to
have a conversation about it, you're not going to know that. It's just all more or less
conjecture.
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•

When it comes to the combatant command level, I think the customer if you will, is
the National Command Authority. And so we have to have this dialogue back and
forth with them or they won't provide us necessarily with a clear definition of the
problem. Nor do they provide us with a clear statement of purpose.

•

So the discussion about how you receive guidance from your higher headquarters, or
from your sponsor, or from your corporate headquarters needs to be a two-way street.
Because when you ask somebody to do something about it, you may have a view of
it, an aggregate view of it, that may not be reflective in the actual facts of the system
as it actually is portrayed on the ground. So that discussion is useful.

•

The frustration for us was national-level leadership would in many cases say... let me
see, it was almost an inverse approach. The national-level leadership would say A, we
would say, "Okay, well what do you want me to achieve?" "Well, we don't know yet.
Give us some ideas and send it up to us and we'll let you know if it's what we're
thinking."

•

However, when we did PowerPoint, it needed to be less is more or more simple in
terms of being able to demonstrate the approach.

•

I think what we did is arming the commander for the conversations he was going to
have with political leaders. And if you want to step down echelons, is arming your
commander to talk to his commander.

•

But in the end, that afforded the Commander the opportunity to have a face to face
conversation with the senior leaders in the nation and say, "This is the defeat. And in
the end, that's what we achieved."
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•

I think one of the most critical shortfalls is that the higher up in echelon you go, the
higher up in responsibility, the higher up a complexity, the less clear your planning
guidance is. And as planners, our greatest responsibility is to drive specificity out of
the leadership into what they want. And again, in a lot of instances, that forces an
uncomfortable conversation between commanders and their bosses.

•

I think as time went on and we again had a greater depth of knowledge and
understanding of the overall environment problems set, but especially in the initial
days it was just on the fly, "Present me a way to have further discussions with the
Secretary and present him some options to address what he's telling me I need to do."

•

Not all of us are that smart and we've got to be able to explain it and be able to talk
about it commonly amongst us, but we also have to put it into a way that we can
explain it to those who are uninitiated.

3. ASSESSABLE: (comments from 50% of the sampling) Enables an assessment of the OE
(not the campaign) exposing emerging problems or opportunities in the changing
operational environment to validate or reject the current solution to the problem (TOV).
•

The second piece (critical shortfall) is assessing the activities' ability to lead us to
where we want to go as opposed to whether we've accomplished the activity and
whether that activity met the desired purpose. What's most important is: is that
purpose then leading us in the direction we eventually want to get to?

•

We’re doing terrible with assessing, we're assessing the plan, and we’re not assessing
execution... You have to assess execution. And then you should be looking at what's
the desired conditions, and how we move towards achieving those conditions.
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•

"Is that getting us where we want to go?" Right? So I did activity X and it generated
result Y, but is that getting me towards future end state Z?

•

The issue that I had from 2014 when I got to CENTCOM to '16 when I took over as
plan's chief was, we assess the plan as opposed to assessing the outcome of the
activity that we conducted.

•

One of the major problems that we faced, is the inability of assessment as true
assessment, not just this is what I know and I'm going to use it to inform the next
step, but the true ability of assessment to feed the next product, is where I think
processes break down…

•

Looking at ways to bring a more dynamic assessment element into that framework is
what's lacking and breaks down in current design in my mind. It's not that it isn't
accurate in its depiction, it’s in application. It never really is applied the way that is
informative of the problem and we're informed about the planning effort.

•

We used to criticize the Israelis for mowing the grass and say, "Oh, they're going into
Gaza again. But that ain't solving the long-term problem." And it ain't. But they mow
the grass enough to where it's a manageable situation. So you're kind of managing the
conflict as opposed to coming to some definitive end state. Maybe we are too
deterministic and say, "We've got to have a clear end state." And maybe we blame
Powell for that. And, "What is our exit strategy?" Well, maybe the exit strategy is a
little bit more amorphous than you'd like it to be…

4. FLEXIBLE: (comments from 50% of the sampling) Recursive and enables rapid
modifications to the campaign through constant analysis resulting in timely decisions and
required adjustments caused by the changing OE.
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•

I also think we're shooting behind the target. And I ask people, when is the last time a
CENTCOM commander received one of these assessments and made a significant
decision to change something? I can't remember one.

•

But there has to be agility in there to allow you to go back and adjust for the
environment that you're operating within. You can't ignore that.

•

But at what point do I need to redefine what it is that we're doing and why we're
doing it?" That goes beyond the process of the military decision making process,
where I need to step back and create maybe more complex thinking for the complex
problems so that the MDMP can solve that problem.

•

But then I think this is part of the continuous nature of the design process or the
planning process for that matter is your continuum. In order to teach or discuss these
things, they had to be laid out linearly. But in fact, the thinking is never linear. It's
always recursive. And so the steps may be numbered from one to 17 pick a number.
And they're always, I'm assuming when you're learning about something of course,
everyone lays out step by step from beginning to end so to speak. But in practice, it's
more recursive. You go from step seven, you go back to step two, then you go
forward to step nine and so on like that. So you're constantly going through more of a
cyclical recursive type of thought process rather than a linear process.

•

Votel made the comment that during none of these assessments, did he make a
decision that changed what the command was doing? And that's the key thing.
Decisions can be made, recommendations can be made, but does it change the
organization? Does it change what the organization is doing, or is something decided
that we direct our component to do something there?
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Appendix 1.4: Plans Chief Model Evaluation
INTRODUCTION. Thank you again for taking the time to allow me to capture your
insights regarding the challenges faced by USCENTCOM Plans Chiefs over the last two
decades. Based on my analysis of your interviews and subsequent synthesis, I have developed a
“Dynamic-Recursive Military Design Model” (MDM) according to scientific methods associated
with qualitative research (see Section 3 of this document). A final question from my Dissertation
Committee resulting from this analysis is to answer whether the proposed MDM is viable based
on lived experience. Therefore, I am using a Focus Group method and select structured
interviews with a number of the Plans Chiefs interviewed to evaluate the viability and, to a
smaller extent, utility of the MDM. Therefore, I am asking you first, to assess the criteria
developed to evaluate the model based on the interview data I derived from all of the interviews.
Once you have had an opportunity to reflect on the criteria, any comments on these criteria or
suggested new criteria may be provided below. I am using four criteria for analyzing two current
DOD military designs. Following your scoring of these two models (the latest from the Joint
Staff’s 2017 design model and the Army’s 2019 design model) based on the provided criteria, I
am asking you to assess the MDM using the same 10-point scale in order to compare the two
extant design models within the DOD to the proposed MDM. The extant models are the current
Joint Design Doctrine (DOD, 2017) and the new Army Design Methodology (DA, 2019).
Your evaluations of these current models and its comparison to proposed Military Design
Model (MDM) will assess the benefits and deficiencies of the new MDM. I will be setting up a
time to call each one of you to go over your assessment and capture your thoughts on the criteria
and the comparison. Once the evaluation is complete, I plan on assembling the group of you on
a Zoom call to discuss the results of the analysis and subsequent comparison provided you are
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available to have a professional discussion on a proposed way forward for the Department
regarding the applicability and utility of Design based on the numerous crisis each of you have
addressed in the Middle East of the last two decades. The proposed MDM will then be modified
to reflect the resultant validated changes to improve its real-world utility based on your subject
matter expertise.
In the following pages I have captured the current doctrine already familiar to you for
your reference followed by a concise description of the new model. Following each doctrinal
description, there is a four-question evaluation. Please place a number from 1 to 10 in the
SCORE box following each question. The questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes
excluding any review of current doctrine you choose to do. The telephonic interview with you
should last no more than 30 minutes for the 12 questions and the Zoom session will probably last
as long as the Bourbon... I look forward to seeing you again soon.
EVALUATION CRITERIA. (Derived from SME observations)
1. Understandable – the concepts of the military design model and associated
methodology are comprehensively, universally, and easily understood among the
planners across the joint force.
2. Explainable – the model is parsimonious thereby ensuring the strategic conversation
resulting from the design of the campaign is not overly complex for senior leaders to
understand and use in their discussions
3. Assessable – the model enables an assessment of the OE (not the campaign) exposing
emerging problems or opportunities in the changing operational environment to
support decision-making and validate or reject the current solution to the problem
(TOV)
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4. Flexible – the model is recursive and enables rapid modifications to the campaign
through constant analysis resulting in timely decisions and required adjustments
caused by the changing OE
SECTION 1: EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT JOINT DESIGN METHODOLOGY
FROM JP 5.0 JOINT PLANNING (2017): OPERATIONAL ART AND
OPERATIONAL DESIGN
1. Overview.
a. The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art
and operational design in conjunction with JPP. They combine art and science to develop
products that describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve
military objectives (ends), given an understanding of unacceptable consequences of employing
capabilities as intended (risk).
(1) Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by
integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of
operational design.
(2) Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that
underpins a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution. The framework is built
upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of the OE; identifies and
frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of
operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or
policy. The operational approach, a primary product of operational design, allows the
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commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into
specific missions and tasks (see Figure IV-1) to produce an executable plan.
b. The purpose of operational design and operational art is to produce an operational
approach, allowing the commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational
concepts into specific missions and tasks and produce an executable plan.
c. Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff
understand the OE and develop broad solutions for mission accomplishment and understand the
uncertainty in a complex OE. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue
concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired
objectives.
d. Operational design and operational art enable understanding. Understanding is more
than just knowledge of the capabilities and capacities of the relevant actors (individuals and
organizations) or the nature of the OE, it provides context for decision making and how the many
facets of the problem are likely to interact, allowing commanders and planners to identify
consequences, opportunities, and recognize risk. The tools described in this chapter are meant to
aid commanders in conducting robust analysis, particularly in handling unexpected events or
those events outside of their previous experience or understanding. Robust analysis will aid in
better understanding and ultimately better decision making.
e. Implementation is based on the commander’s and planners’ experience and time
available. Different commanders and planners will need different tools to help them as each
person has inherent strengths, weaknesses, and prejudices. Similarly, every problem is different
and may require different tools to analyze and address it. The tools chosen by the planner should
be appropriate for the problem and should complement the planners’ strengths and weaknesses.
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(1) The amount of data readily available today can quickly overwhelm the
planning process. Planners and commanders need to understand that a good timely
decision with incomplete information may present a better solution than waiting until all
information is available.
(2) In the complex social systems that are an integral part of military operations,
additional data can greatly increase the complexity of the problem without aiding
understanding. Operational art aids the commander in identifying the point of
diminishing returns in collection and analysis.

Figure 1.1A. Developing the Operational Approach.
2. Operational Design.
a. Operational design is a methodology to aid commanders and planners in organizing
and understanding the OE.
b. There are four major components to operational design (see Figure IV-3). The
components have characteristics that exist outside of each other and are not necessarily
sequential. However, an understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior to
developing operational approaches.
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c. Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff
understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in
a complex OE. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue concerning the nature
of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired objectives.
d. The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for
follow-on joint operations.
e. Methodology. The general methodology in operational design is:
(1) Understand the strategic direction and guidance.
(2) Understand the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics).
(3) Understand the OE.
(4) Define the problem.
(5) Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational
assumptions).
(6) Develop options (the operational approach).
(7) Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).
(8) Refine the operational approach(es).
(9) Develop planning guidance.
f. These steps are not necessarily sequential. Iteration and reexamination of earlier work
is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified
during the process.
3. Developing Operational Approaches
a. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force
can take to achieve an objective in support of the national objective or attain a military end state.
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It is the commander’s visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into
the desired conditions—the way the commander envisions the OE at the conclusion of operations
to support national objectives. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of
the OE and the problem facing the JFC. A discussion of operational approaches within and
between options forms the basis of the IPRs between the CCDR and SecDef and staff (to ensure
consistency with US policy and national objectives). Once SecDef approves the approach, it
provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. The JFC and staff
should continually review, update, and modify the approach as policy, the OE, end states, or the
problem change. This requires frequent and continuing dialogue at all levels of command.

Figure 1.2A. Operational Design Framework.
b. Commanders and their staffs can use operational design when planning any joint
campaign or operation. Notwithstanding a commander’s judgment, education, and experience,
the OE often presents situations so complex that understanding them—let alone attempting to
change them—exceeds individual capacity. Nor does such complexity lend itself to coherent
planning. Bringing adequate order to complex problems to facilitate further detailed planning
requires an iterative dialogue between commander, the planning staff, and policy staff. Rarely
will members of either staff recognize an implicit operational approach during their initial
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analysis and synthesis of the OE. Successful development of the approach requires continuous
analysis, learning, dialogue, and collaboration between commander and staff, as well as other
subject matter experts. The challenge is even greater when the joint operation involves other
agencies, the private sector, and multinational partners (which is typically the case), whose
unique considerations can complicate the problem.
c. It is essential that commanders, through a dialogue with their staffs, planning teams,
initiative groups, and any other relevant sources of information, first gain an understanding of the
OE, to include the US policy perspective, and define the problem facing the joint force prior to
conducting detailed planning. The problem as presented in guidance documents rarely includes
all available guidance information and may identify the symptoms rather than the actual
problem. From this understanding of the OE and definition of the problem, commanders develop
their broad operational approach for transforming current conditions into desired conditions. The
operational approach will underpin the operation and the detailed planning that follows. As
detailed planning occurs, the JFC and staff continue discourse and refine their operational
approach.
SECTION 2: EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY
ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY (ADP 5-0, 31 July 2019)
2-89. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative
thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. ADM
is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning, but it must be integrated with the detailed
planning typically associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans and orders. There is
no one way or prescribed set of steps to employ the ADM. There are, however, several activities
associated with ADM including framing an OE, framing problems, developing an operational
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approach, and reframing when necessary as shown in figure 2-4. While planners complete some
activities before others, the understanding and learning within one activity may require revisiting
the learning from another activity. Thus, ADM is iterative in nature.

Figure 1.3A. Joint Design Doctrine Evaluation Criteria.
2-90. When problems are difficult to identify, the operation’s end state is unclear, or a
COA is not self-evident, commanders employ ADM. This is often the case when developing
long-range plans for extended operation or developing supporting plans to the CCP and
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associated contingencies. The results of ADM include an understanding of an OE and problem,
the initial commander’s intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between
conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during
ADM, commanders issue planning guidance—to include an operational approach—to guide
more detailed planning using the MDMP. (See ATP 5-0.1 for techniques for employing ADM.)

Figure 1.4A. Activities of Army Design Methodology.
2-91. ADM includes interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning.
By first framing an OE and its associated problems, ADM helps commanders and staffs to think
about the situation in depth. This in-depth thinking enables them to develop a more informed
approach to solve or manage identified problems. During execution, ADM supports
organizational learning through reframing. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a
new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier
hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. In
essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand about an OE,
the problem, and the desired end state.
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THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
2-92. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to
understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan
or order. It is an orderly, analytical process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff,
and subordinate headquarters in the development of a plan or order. The MDMP helps leaders
apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgement, logic, and professional knowledge to develop
situational understanding and produce a plan or order that best accomplishes the mission.
2-93. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has inputs, a series of
sub-steps, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation
facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps
sequentially; however, before producing the plan or order, they may revisit several steps in an
iterative fashion as they learn more about the situation. The seven steps are—
•

Step 1 – Receipt of mission.

•

Step 2 – Mission analysis.

•

Step 3 – COA development.

•

Step 4 – COA analysis.

•

Step 5 – COA comparison.

•

Step 6 – COA approval.

•

Step 7 – Orders production, dissemination, and transition.

2-94. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt of, or in anticipation of, a mission.
Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of an approved higher headquarters’
OPLAN or OPORD. In these instances, they start planning based on a warning order
(WARNORD), a planning order, or an alert order from higher headquarters. This requires active
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collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or
order is developed. (See FM 6-0 for detailed instructions for conducting the MDMP.)
1) When viewing design from a practitioner perspective, it is important to understand if the design
methodology is too confusing because of its complexity or, conversely too broad and general to be of
use then planning time is wasted and unproductive. On a scale of 1-10, in your professional
assessment, how well does the Army Design Methodology provide a method for designing military
campaigns that is understandable with 1 being a poor method and 10 being an effective method?

The process is
too general
for effectively
designing
campaigns

The Design process
is logical and easy
to follow in a
systematic manner

The process is too
complicated for
new planners to use
in practice; the
products are too
confusing for the
Commander

SCORE

COMMENTS:
1) Military Design should create products that facilitate a conversation between the Commander and
POTUS/SECDEF at the Combatant Command level or between a Commander and his higher leadership
at the Operational Level. On a scale of 1-10, in your professional assessment, does Army Design
Methodology provide products that enhance a strategic conversation between a commander and his
senior national leadership or among his senior commanders in the field?

Unsure of the
Products that
the process
produces

The process creates
products, unsure if
they support the
conversation at a
strategic level

The Design process
creates products
that support a
Strategic
Conversation

SCORE

COMMENTS:
1) One common comment during the interviews was that current design does not effectively assess the
impact of the campaign on the operational environment or the current state of the problem the
campaign is designed to solve. On a scale of 1-10, in your professional opinion, how well does the
MDM enable an assessment of the SOLUTION to the problem vice an assessment of the Campaign Plan
(MOEs/MOPs)?

Doesn’t
include
assessment

Assesses
the
campaign

Assesses
the OE and
problem;
tees up
decisions

SCORE

COMMENTS:

2) There was a common perception that the current process does not tee up decisions for the
Commander to change the campaign or modify the Theory of Victory to achieve a new solution based
on the increased understanding of the problem and how its evolved since the implementation of the
campaign. On a scale of 1 to 10, in your professional opinion, how flexible is Joint Design Doctrine to
enable rapid modifications to the campaign through constant analysis resulting in timely decisions and
required adjustments caused by the changing OE and the Problem?

The process is not
flexible enough to
adapt to the
complex and
evolving OE

The process
addresses the
need to adapt the
Campaign to the
evolving, complex
problem

The process
enables the
Commander to
rapidly adjust the
Campaign to the
dynamic OE

COMMENTS:

Figure 1.5A. Army Design Methodology Evaluation Criteria.
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SCORE

SECTION 3: EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MILITARY DESIGN MODEL
There are four distinct spaces whereby design occurs for campaigns using the Military
Design Model: The Problem Space, The Solution Space, The Modeling Space and the
Operational Space. In the Problem Space, the planner defines the problem to be solved within
the context of the strategic environment. This moves to the Solution Space where a Theory of
Victory is developed based on well-defined success criteria. The Theory of Victory is the
hypothesis for how the use of the military instrument will result in reducing the problem and
achieving the policy objectives of the campaign. It results in a mission statement and military
objectives as the Operational Design. Finally, the Operational Design moves to the Operational
Space where the Operational Approach is developed. The approach breaks down the complex
problem in to several complicated or medium-structured problems in the physical battlespace
(along LOEs or LOOs) in order to apply action that create desired changes to the OE. The
Approach them moves into the standard MDMP to develop the campaign. The following slides
provide an overview for the new concept.

Figure 1.6A. Proposed Military Design Model.
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Figure 1.7A. Military Design Model Design Spaces.
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Figure 1.8A. Military Design Model Evaluation Criteria.
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CHAPTER TWO:
GREAT POWER COMPETITION CASE STUDY

Abstract
A USCENTCOM Planning Team (known as an Operational Planning Team or ‘OPT’)
was given the task of determining how to use military resources under his command to compete
with adversaries in a space between peace and war that he called the ‘Gray Zone’. Other
competitors such as Russia, China and Iran were conducting various military actions short of war
to achieve their national objectives at the expense of the United States. The plans team, using
military design and the associated military decision-making process (MDMP) had to answer
several questions that emerged during the analysis. What is the nature of ‘competition’ and how
does it differ from normal military ‘combat’? What types of competitive approaches are there,
and what does a successful competitive campaign actually achieve? How would one even
recognize success and, if so, how can success be measured? It is a complicated topic; many
issues had to be addressed if the resultant activities designed to thwart an adversary’s efforts in
the competitive space were to protect U.S. interests but avoid an escalation in military activity
that could lead to another war in the Middle East. In short, the OPT had to define a complex
problem, develop corresponding approaches for the Department to compete and succeed in this
‘Gray Zone,’ but ensure this military activity did not move beyond competition and into conflict.
This case study set in 2018 explores the concepts of complexity and uncertainty
associated with particularly complex problems that affect strategic decision-making. It also
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explores the Nature of Competition including the associated concepts of coopetition, multipoint
competition and the strategic concepts of corporate policy and its relationship to corporate
strategy and resources. The case examines the efforts of military planners as they attempt to
define an emerging complex problem that results in changes to the strategic environment along
with their efforts to develop potential solutions for this emerging problem as a venue for
exploring the construct of Competition in a broader, more general, and largely undefined theory
of the Nature of Competition.
This research provided several useful products applicable to the findings in the first
article of this dissertation regarding the proposed Military Design Model (MDM). OPT
members encountered several of the challenges described by the Plans Chiefs during the
interviews and subsequent coding and analysis. Several artifacts that were developed during the
course of this design and planning effort are captured in this article. Although is no correlation
between the themes and subsequent model derived from the analysis of the qualitative data,
causation between challenges encountered during the design process that led to the invention of
artifacts applicable to the various design spaces of the MDM corroborate the reflections and
recommendations of the Plans Chiefs interviewed as part of this research.
The ‘Useless’ Case Study: Understanding the ‘Gray Zone’ and the Return of Great
Power Competition2
Our military is designed to fight and win our Nation’s wars, but now the dilemma is how
to use its vast capabilities in defense of U.S. national interests during times of Great Power
Competition …without going to war.

2

NOTE: The opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within this case are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other Department or
Agency of the U.S. Government.
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Introduction
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Kris Faught was a Marine Corps helicopter pilot with
multiple combat tours including two in Iraq. Known to the military aviation community as
‘Useless’ 3, a unique military call sign each pilot is given, he was assigned as a lead planner at
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in the summer of 2017. USCENTCOM is the
command that directs operations in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and the greater Middle East. In
August, the 4-star general who commanded USCENTCOM had given Useless the task to
determine how to use military resources under his command to compete with adversaries such as
Russia and Iran in a space between peace and war that he was calling the ‘Gray Zone’. Although
the U.S. military was, arguably, one of the finest in history, competitors such as Russia and Iran
were conducting military actions short of war to achieve their policy goals, many of which
threatened U.S. national interests. Currently, the Defense Department was working to improve
its approach to counter such activities occurring as a result of Great Power competition (Kapusta,
2015).
"The world, to quote George Shultz, is awash in change, defined by increasing
global volatility and uncertainty with Great Power competition between nations
becoming a reality once again. Though we will continue to prosecute the campaign
against terrorists that we are engaged in today, Great Power competition, not terrorism, is
now the primary focus of U.S. national security… We face growing threats from
revisionist powers as different as China and Russia are from each other, nations that do
seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models, pursuing veto authority
over other nations' economic, diplomatic and security decisions. 4"
– Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, January 19, 2018

3

Call signs are given to military pilots for use when they talk to each other over the radio. Some examples from the
movie ‘Top Gun’ include Maverick, Goose, Iceman and Joker. Lt Col Faught is known as Useless on the radio.
4
From a speech given at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins
University discussing the recently published National Defense Strategy signed by Secretary Mattis.
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USCENTCOM is one of the 6 geographic combatant commands that oversees military
operations around the globe. USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility is in the Middle East and
South Asia. Within this command there are four components, one for each service, led by 3-star
commanders along with a special operations component under the command of a 2-star general.
USCENTCOM has a staff at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida consisting of eight Directorates.
To answer the Commander’s task, the lead planner had to form an Operational Planning Team
(OPT) consisting of planners from across the USCENTCOM staff to define the ‘Gray Zone’ and
the types of military activities that could be used in that operational space. Then the OPT would
have to sequence those activities in time, space and purpose to accomplish the – as of yet to be
determined – objective(s). In order to sequence those activities in some logical order, the OPT
would also have to develop some operational approaches for the Gray Zone to provide a coherent
framework.
It was incumbent upon the OPT to answer the Commander’s directive to define the Gray
Zone and determine the best approach to compete there. But to determine the best approach for
competing short of armed conflict, one had to answer several additional questions that emerged
during the analysis. What is the nature of ‘competition’ and how does it differ from ‘combat’
where the military normally operates? What types of competitive approaches are there? What
does a successful competitive operation actually achieve? Would we even recognize success
and, if so, how is success measured? It was a complicated topic with a number of issues that had
to be addressed if the resultant activities were to prevent an escalation of military actions that
could lead to another war in the Middle East. The OPT had done a significant amount of
analysis and created a framework for understanding competition short of armed conflict.
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Research Method
The researcher is a senior strategist for the Department of Defense who has worked at
U.S. Central Command for over a decade. He has participated in numerous planning efforts
involving real world crises in the Middle East, Europe and North America. The research
method is a case study with participant-observation. Two interviews were conducted with Lt
Col Faught. Additional interviews were conducted with members of the OPT including the
intelligence planner, special operations planner and information operations planner. Due to the
sensitivity of some of the information, the interviews were not recorded. The material from the
interviews were then searched on the unclassified internet. As documents produced by the
planning team were identified containing sensitive information, that information was excluded
in the case study and the remaining information was unclassified. A review of the products
produced several findings applicable to the DOD planning and design processes.
Understanding the Gray Zone
It was February 2018 and Useless was scheduled to brief the Commander on the results
of his analysis. As he thought about his efforts over the last couple of months, Useless had led
the efforts of the OPT to define the Gray Zone. Additionally, he had contacted some experts
within the Defense Department who were also working to define that competitive space more
adequately between peace and war in order to find out what they had learned. OPTs consist of
trained military planners who analyze complex problems within a command and provide
recommended solutions to a commander. His OPT’s efforts had yielded a variety of insights on
the nature of competition and the types of military activities that might be conducted in this Gray
Zone. Useless and his team had conducted a wargame to analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of those activities. He also hosted a conference with representatives from the
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Departments of Commerce, Justice, State and Treasury along with some representatives from the
Defense Intelligence Agency to explore areas where the Defense Department might be able to
assist their efforts to counter the actions of these adversarial competitors. Both the wargame and
the conference provided a wide number of insights regarding the definition of the Gray Zone and
the nature of competition below the level of armed conflict.
The OPT had to do three things: 1) help the Commander understand an operational
environment defined by competition as opposed to combat, 2) frame the complex, ill-structured
problem that the competition must resolve, and 3) design some broad, competitive approaches to
solve that problem. The team would then recommend one of those approaches (or a combination
thereof) for the command to adopt before conducting the detailed planning associated with
developing an executable campaign. The Gray Zone problem is an interesting paradox: our
military is designed to fight and win our nation’s wars, but now the question is how to use our
military in defense of our national interests without going to war. Traditionally, we think of
being either at war or at peace. However, it is increasingly apparent that just because the United
States is not at war does not necessarily mean it is at peace globally. Because the solution is not
black or white but somewhere in between, this ‘Gray Zone’ was, by definition, a complex or
‘wicked’ problem. (Rittel & Webber, 1973) This seems like a new way of looking at conflict – or
is it?
General Mattis once said, “If you are looking for a new idea, read an old book.”
Reviewing the literature regarding military operations in peacetime published since the end of
World War 2, it is clear that the concept of competing short of armed conflict is not new. In
1948, the architect of the containment strategy for the Cold War labeled employment of the
nation’s resources short of armed conflict as ‘Political Warfare’ (Kennan, 1948). In response to
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Russia’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, Henry Kissinger called for a defense of the ‘Gray
Areas’ in an article published in 1955 (Kissinger, 1955). In the 1980s, U.S. Army doctrine called
political-military confrontation between states ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC) and in the 1990s,
the Army changed the term LIC to ‘Military Operations other than War’ to address the activities
of any military short of major combat operations (DA 1990; DOD, 1995b). All of these
documents over the last 70 years have addressed, to varying degrees, the idea of Great Power
competition and an American approach. Starting with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the
American approach has continued to evolve over the last 195 years from the initial ‘isolationist’
approach to Great Power politics in Europe to becoming the world’s dominant superpower
facing Great Power competition.
Developing a commonly understood framework for competition with a corresponding
lexicon for the U.S. Government is crucial for success. As the U.S. Special Operations
Command’s (USSOCOM) White Paper on the Gray Zone suggests:
“Changing our vocabulary could help yield better decisions in the gray zone.
Adopting a business vocabulary and a “SWOT” model (strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threat) would open other opportunities not available in military
decision-making models. Similar to the way businesses decide to allocate capital, we
would necessarily distinguish between opportunities and threats and have at least an
estimate of our expected return on investment. Talking and thinking differently about
national security in the gray zone would help us measure the oft-ignored opportunity
costs and develop some metric, however imperfect initially, to measure our expected
return on investment of defense dollars.” (Kapusta, 2015)
Understanding the dynamics of resource allocation to Gray Zone activities in a multipolar, global environment is one challenge. The lack of a common vocabulary to discuss Great
Power competition is another. Useless and his team had a difficult task ahead. Similar to flying
an airplane as you are building it, they would have to develop some sort of doctrinal approach for
Gray Zone operations so they could then operationalize it through several valid courses of action.
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Only then could they compare these approaches, identify the advantages and disadvantages of
each and determine the best recommendation.
First, the OPT had to define the concept of Competition Short of Armed Conflict and
then distinguish between competitive activities and those of War or Peace. Instead of using the
terms war and peace, the OPT identified some terms from a variety of business concepts and
placed all the resulting amalgamation of activities on a spectrum between cooperation and
conflict (Burke et al., 2018). Between cooperation on the low end of the spectrum and conflict on
the high end of that spectrum is the area of competition. It is in this area that the Commander
was calling the Gray Zone. (See Figure 2.1)
As the OPT worked to define the Gray Zone, they reviewed the latest research conducted
by the Department of Defense and noticed that the competitive space is bounded by two factors:
1) the intention of a competitor’s use of its military resources committed to the competition, and
2) the legality of the military action used. If all rivals in the competitive space are collectively
following the laws, treaties and international agreements that generally govern internationally
recognized legitimate behavior, then all parties are adhering to international norms or
‘corresponding’. In this condition, all parties are said to be in a state of cooperation. The factor
at this end of the spectrum that separates cooperation from competition is intent. One party may
take very public actions that it attributes to adhering to international norms, but the actions that
party takes are intentionally ambiguous and the party may be concealing the true intent behind
the actual military activity.
For example, Russia’s move into the Crimea to ‘defend’ a newly elected government or
China’s establishment of artificial islands to ‘protect’ shipping are examples of concealed intent.
In the case of the Crimea, Russia ‘answered’ a request for help from the newly elected
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government of the Crimea – one the Russian government worked to install – under Article 51 of
the UN Charter5. Their stated intent was to protect the newly elected government from a military
invasion and defend that government against any illegal actions by the Ukrainian government to
overthrow a democratically elected government as authorized by the United Nations Charter. In
reality, the Russians created a governing crisis in the Crimea using a variety of military and nonmilitary resources and conducted activities that led to a call for a new vote for a ruling party.
The Russians then used additional assets to control an election that brought a government
sympathetic to Russian national interests to power. When this ‘new government’ was not
recognized by politicians in Kiev (or elsewhere around the world), the newly elected Crimean
government called on Russian forces to ‘defend their legitimate right to rule’. Russian forces
rolled into the Crimea without firing a shot in anger and subsequently annexed the Crimea.
Russia effectively concealed the invasion of Crimea under the auspices of Article 51 and the
‘intent’ to defend the democratically elected government of Crimea. This is an example of
blurring the line between cooperation and competition that separates ‘Peace’ from the ‘Gray
Zone’.

Figure 2.1. The Competitive Space.
5

Article 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.
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At the other end of the spectrum are the legal considerations. If a nation commits an
action the United States would consider an ‘act of war’, then there is legal justification for the
United States to use its overwhelming conventional military forces in the defense of U.S.
national interests. What the Chinese and Russians did with the use of their military forces in the
Crimea and South China Seas is not ‘technically’ considered an act of war therefore there is no
military justification for the use of force and, subsequently, no conflict. Legally, there was little
the western world could do contest the Russian invasion. Similarly, China has built and
militarily occupied artificial islands in the South China Sea that it uses to establish an economic
exclusion zone and claim the mineral rights out to 200 miles from these islands. This affects the
other countries who also have a claim to the mineral rights in the area such as Vietnam,
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. (See Appendix 2.1)
But the Commander’s concern was with the Middle East and Iran’s actions that were
short of armed conflict. Iran conducts a lot of activity through the use of proxies and surrogates
in the region. Iran supports Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon – a terrorist organization. Iran
supports the Houthis in Yemen and provides them missiles that have been shot into Riyadh at the
Arab population there and at shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. At the same time however, the
United States is working alongside Iranian forces in Iraq to defeat ISIS. Subsequently, this
creates a condition where the United States is competing with Iran in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen
but working together with Iranian forces in Iraq to defeat ISIS (or D’aesh as the group is known
in the Arabic). Known in the business community as ‘coopetition’, this combination of
overlapping cooperative efforts with competitive efforts exists at the bottom end of the Gray
Zone spectrum. (See Appendix 2.3)
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Developing Some Competitive Approaches
There were some planning considerations that the team needed to keep in mind as they
developed some valid competitive approaches. First, it was unlikely that this effort would
receive a substantial amount of additional resources from the Pentagon. With the forces
committed to the ISIS fight in Iraq and Syria and the other forces dedicated to the mission in
Afghanistan, the Pentagon was unlikely to dedicate more forces to any long-term commitment in
the Middle East. The resultant planning effort should therefore focus on minimizing the amount
of additional resources required for any competitive approach. Second, executing any of the
military activities under consideration should not escalate into another war in the Middle East.
This would defeat the purpose of operating in the Gray Zone as defined by the work on framing
the competitive space.
In order to develop different options, the OPT looked at the elements of what military
professionals define as ‘strategy’ consisting of ENDS, WAYS and MEANS (Lykke, 1997).
Lykke’s model for military strategy is applicable for this analysis and became the foundation for
developing the competitive approaches. Understanding the distinctions between each element of
strategy and the relationship of each element to competition became important to developing
approaches that unhinged an element of the competitor’s strategy. Any long-term effort has to
balance the desired goals or objectives to be achieved (ENDS) with the approach (WAYS) for
accomplishing those objectives while accounting for the resources (MEANS) available to
execute that approach. In most cases, the ENDS – WAYS – MEANS relationships are viewed as
a linear process of MEANS feeding the WAYS to accomplish the ENDS.
These elements are similar to the business concepts of Policy, Strategy and Resources
(Davies, 2000). Within the business school, Davies discusses the differences between Corporate
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Policy, Corporate Strategy and Resources along with the importance of understanding the
linkages and distinctions. Very similar to the concepts outlined by Lykke, Davies “troika”
became a key theoretical foundation for the OPT to understand and develop competitive
approaches. The business construct describes this process of POLICY (Ends) – STRATEGY
(Ways) – RESOURCES (Means) as a troika or triangle of inter-related concepts instead of a
linear relationship (Davies, 2000). By placing the military linear process into the business
triangle it becomes apparent that one method for creating distinct approaches to competition is to
focus the competitive efforts on each of the three edges of the triangle to disrupt either the
POLICY – STRATEGY relationship, the STRATEGY – RESOURCE relationship or the
POLICY – RESOURCE relationship. (See Figure 2.2)

Figure 2.2. Developing Competitive Approaches.
The first option identified is the Direct Approach. This approach focused on countering a
competitor’s Strategy (WAYS) to disrupt its ability to achieve its Policy (ENDS). Taking such
an approach complicates a competitor’s efforts to achieve its policy objectives resulting in an
unsuccessful effort to achieve its goals. After analyzing this approach, it was apparent that this
was the approach typically used in most military and business competitive environments.
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The second option is the Periphery Approach which is designed to increase the resources
(MEANS) a competitor requires to obtain and then sustain its desired policy objectives (ENDS).
However, these policy objectives the competitor is pursuing are of little or no interest to U.S.
interests. Doing so complicates the distribution of resources between internal and external
priorities. In drawing a distinction between the Periphery Approach and the Direct approach, it
is important to examine the resources being used. If the desired approach is to keep a competitor
spending resources in an area that is of no value or interest to one’s own corporate strategy, then
it is a Periphery Approach. A historical military example is the Peninsular War of 1807 which
forced Napoleon Bonaparte to expend significant resources on the Iberian Peninsula. This is an
example of a Periphery Campaign that had the French fighting the Spanish until 1814 on a
Peninsula under the blockade of the British. Napoleon referred to the conflict as the “Spanish
Ulcer.”
The third option was the Diversionary Approach which creates an unanticipated crisis
(real or imagined) for one’s competitor that requires a new strategy (WAYS) to maintain its
relative position thereby forcing a competing expenditure of resources (MEANS). As one’s
competitor focuses on an emerging threat, it must commit resources from a finite pool to counter
the emerging threat thereby reducing resources for other priorities. This was part of the approach
the United States used during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. As the American military
increased its technological advantage through a variety of military capabilities, the Soviets had to
expand its capital investments to develop corresponding capabilities required to offset the
unexpected American advantage in a number of domains.
A fourth option created by the OPT was the Dependency Approach. Whereas the other
three approaches generally have a negative aim (denying an adversary from changing the status
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quo in its favor), this fourth option looked to see if it could pursue a positive aim (changing the
status quo/competitive space in one’s favor). This new approach focuses on creating
dependencies within the competitive space that provides leverage for future crises. As an
adversary becomes more and more reliant on a friendly system or resource (as in the discussion
regarding Coopetition), it creates a point of leverage over an adversary in a crisis. This
dependency can also be used to deter de-stabilizing adversary behavior by reducing its freedom
of action.

Figure 2.3. Determining the Best Approach.
Types of Military Activities Used in Each Approach
There are a number of tactical military activities that support any of the approaches.
Whereas the approach defines the purpose and goal of the operation, the military activities
provide the specific tactical actions over time that are used to compete with an adversary. These
military actions fall into seven general categories of action and are combined in a manner
consistent with the chosen approach. The categories and corresponding activities are:
1. Intelligence Operations – Intelligence collection, counter-intelligence operations and
information sharing.
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2. Maneuver Operations – Operations conducted by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps and Special Operations Forces that include deterrence, exercises, presence and
posture in the region.
3. Financial Operations – Support to departments that enforce sanctions and counter the
adversary’s access to finances such as the Departments of Treasury and Commerce.
4. Lethal Operations – Operations that target terrorists from organizations declared by
the State Department as a terrorist organization. These operations can be kinetic (e.g.
a drone strike) or non-kinetic (e.g. placing pictures or files in someone’s computer
that provides evidence of suspicious or questionable behavior that causes the
arrest/death of an individual).
5. Legal Operations – Operations that remove an adversary’s operative from the
competitive space through the use of law enforcement. One doesn’t have to conduct
a lethal operation to kill an operative if local law enforcement personnel arrest then
confines the adversary in a detention facility.
6. Information Operations – A wide variety of messaging activities that include public
relations, key leader engagement, psychological operations, media support (e.g.
‘Voice of America’) and military deception.
7. Partner Operations – Assurance actions conducted with our partners in the region and
providing support to international organizations or non-governmental organizations
(IOs/NGOs) and leveraging the effects of their efforts. Military exercises are an
example of partner operations.
The biggest consideration in using these types of operations involves the authority to do
so according to the U.S. Code. Military activities are governed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
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However, conducting any type of information operations within a country is generally under the
control of the State Department and its Ambassador under Title 22 of the U.S. Code. Arresting
someone is an authority that resides with the Coast Guard under Title 14 or the Department of
Justice under Title 28. Obtaining financial resources to fund operations resides with Congress.
Therefore, in addition to determining the military capabilities and tactical activities required to
execute the competitive approach (i.e. Resources/Means), there is also a requirement to
determine what additional authorities the Command may require to execute the approach that
don’t reside in those defined by Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The Commander of USCENTCOM
has legal authority to execute operations under Title 10. So, if a military operation uses lethal
force during a declared war with its associated legal justification for action, it is called ‘combat’.
If a military operation uses lethal force without a legal justification, it is called ‘murder’.
In order for the OPT to determine which approach was best, it would need to consider the
resources required and any additional authorities the command would need based on the U.S.
Code. It would also have to scope the problem. One way to scope the problem is to focus on the
adversary and the objectives it is trying to achieve. Another way would be to focus on the
environment (Middle East) and assess the adversary’s actions based on its effect on the
operational environment. Once the planners identify the ideal environment based on U.S.
national interests, the planners can then determine any detrimental effects that actions by the
adversary are having on the environment and then choose an approach that mitigates those
adverse effects. For example, Houthis firing Iranian rockets into Saudi Arabia has a destabilizing effect. Arming and funding Lebanese Hezbollah so they can attack Israel has a destabilizing effect. Iran providing electric power to Iraq has a stabilizing effect. So, the question is
whether to focus on specific Iranian behavior and use that to define the problem, or, focus on the
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difference between the current operational environment and the ideal/desired operational
environment, then use that difference to define the problem.
Understanding the Impact on the Operational Environment
In considering this actor vs. environment dynamic as part of the effort to frame the
problem, a question emerges regarding acceptable adversary behavior. For example, there is
much in the media describing Iran’s efforts through proxies and surrogates in the competitive
space that clearly has a de-stabilizing influence on the operational environment. But there may
be some activity that can be regarded as legitimate actions of any nation state. For example,
Iranian missiles fired from Yemen into Saudi Arabia is seen by other nations in the world as
illegitimate, but European bombs dropped from Saudi fighters on the proxies firing those
missiles is considered acceptable – from a Western perspective. Therefore, one consideration
when determining the competitive actions to execute against an adversary is to define more
precisely the exact competitive activities that are considered acceptable from those that are
unacceptable. This will drive the appropriate competitive approach.
Another consideration regards the definition of success. What does a successful
campaign actually look like? It became apparent from the analysis that any competition only
ceases when one competitor leaves the competition. Therefore, success needs to be tied to the
conditions the competitive approach is trying to create in the operational environment. These
conditions may be viewed along a spectrum between what one adversary wants and what its rival
wants. For example, the U.S. is using a cost-imposing strategy to change Iranian behavior
through the “Maximum Pressure Campaign”. Sanctions are an effort to impose an economic
cost. Therefore, there is a condition one may measure tied to Iranian economic prosperity from
month to month. Iran’s economic condition will change from month to month based on a variety
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of factors including sanctions. If the U.S. wants Iran to be less prosperous and the Iranians want
to be more prosperous, this becomes an evolving condition from month to month. Success is
therefore defined by the direction any given condition is trending – in this case, towards more
prosperity or less prosperity.
LESS

MORE

Prosperity

Month 2

Month 1

Figure 2.4. Measuring Success on a Continuum.
Because of this continuously changing condition, it is difficult to determine who is the
winner or loser regarding a particular condition. All one can say is that the competitive position
either improved or deteriorated vis a vis the competitors. As one planner pointed out, “There are
no winners or losers in the competitive space, only winning or losing at a particular point in
time.”
Conclusions and Contributions
The work of the OPT resulted in a number of contributions to the Department’s
understanding of great power competition – particularly the conceptualization of the competitive
space of a given operational environment. However, the Department requires updated doctrine
to reflect the increased understanding of competition short of armed conflict. Key concepts
developed by the OPT include:
Strategic Context
When examining the Problem Space, the biggest discovery uncovered by the efforts of
the OPT entailed placing competition short of armed conflict in context. Placing the problem
within the context of the operational environment enables planners to clearly articulate how the
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operational approach will address the problem and how the sequence of activities arrayed in
time, space and purpose will accomplish the desired end. Based on the framework for
competition short of armed conflict defined by Figure 1, the idea of phasing is less useful at the
strategic level. Instead, operational planners should refrain from looking at military operations
over time in terms of war or peace. The analysis clearly shows that great power competition
continues over time and, as the level of hostilities increases, actions approach a point that is
considered an act of war and two nations move from great power competition into state-on-state
violence historically termed “War”. The war increases resources and violence over a series of
operational phases ending with defined or negotiated war termination criteria. However, short of
an unconditional surrender the actors move back into a state of regional or global competition
(See Figure 2.5).
When one removes the idea of moving from a state of ‘Peace’ to a state of ‘War’ and
replaces it with the concept of transitioning from competition to conflict, it is evident that any
nation will prosecute a military campaign over time until the violence is reduced to a level that
enables a transitions back to competition. The key strategic question that the campaign design
should address is, “What ‘competitive advantage’ does the campaign create that provides
strategic leverage within the operational environment? It is also important to note that war
planners must also consider the necessary actions required to manage the multi-polar competitive
environment while war is waged concurrently.
Defining Success
One of the hardest things planners at a strategic level have to define when examining the
Solution Space is what success looks like. At the tactical level, it is relatively simple: Seize that
hill, bomb that target, stop that attack. But at the strategic level, success has more to do with
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what happens after the fighting stops. This is even more complex in competition as there is no
end to the competition until one side quits. One should always remember that an enemy quits
not because of what has already happened, but because of what he fears might happen if he does
not. When thinking about competition from a sports perspective, consider long distance runners.
These runners quit not because of how far they’ve run, but because of how far they have to go.

Figure 2.5. Phasing vs Operations Over Time on a Continuum.
This dynamic is complicated by the fact that many cases in scholarly research use
‘competition’ as an adverb. When reviewing the literature, it is difficult to define ‘competition’
in and of itself. Rather, terms such as competitive strategies, competitive advantage or even
forces that shape strategy are used to describe competition vice defining it. This is likely due to
the fact that it is difficult to consider the concept of ‘competition’ as humans are essentially
competitive creatures by nature. Walker Percy once observed, “A fish does not reflect on the
nature of water. He cannot imagine its absence, so he cannot consider its presence." This does
beg the question, is the human study of competition similar to fish considering water? One
observation that was consistent throughout the case research involved the development of a
common lexicon. When discussing the nature of competition, there is a need for greater
precision in our language. Words are important. Words matter therefore the Department must
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develop doctrine to create a common language among the services to discuss Great Power
Competition and its associated military operations.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Competitive Approach
Trying to determine which competitive approach is best for competing in the competitive
space was the largest contribution of examining the various operational approaches for the
Operational space. This was done by comparing the different approaches and to determine if
there were similarities in the approaches. The team found that the Direct approach and the
Periphery approach both centered on the amount of effort required to execute the competition
and an analogy for defining this difference was useful to understand the difference. If you were
to ask yourself, “What is the difference between a world-class juggler and a world-class plate
spinner?” The answer is that a world-class juggler can only juggle about 12 items. A world-class
plate spinner, on the other hand, can spin about 100 plates. The difference between the two is
that the juggler has to touch each object he is juggling every revolution. The plate spinner only
requires a system whereby he taps the plates periodically to keep them all spinning. The Direct
Approach is the juggler and requires the most effort. The Periphery Approach is the plate
spinner and much more efficient for a cost-imposing strategy.
The other two approaches involved imposing costs on your adversary. The plans team
determined that if the desired approach to the competition is to create a new challenge that forces
one’s competitor to divert resources from the current strategy to address the new challenge, then
it is a Diversionary Approach. The distinction lies in whether one’s competitor is already
conducting operations in an area or not. The Periphery Approach only consumes enough
resources to keep one’s opponent engaged in an activity that is of little importance whereas the
Diversionary Approach attempts to create a new expenditure of resources for the competitor.
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From the pros and cons of the case, it is apparent the direct approach needs the most
resources and authorities to execute operations consistent with the approach. On the other hand,
the dependency approach required the least amount of resources and additional authorities. From
this perspective, using a dependency approach could be executed now whereas the direct
approach would need additional approvals from the Pentagon. (See Figure 2.3) While the
periphery approach did not require a large amount of additional resources, it needs approval of
some additional authorities to execute the approach. The diversionary approach was just the
opposite. It would not require additional legal authorities, but to sustain the approach over the
long term, it would require a continuing commitment of resources that would reduce the
organization’s ability to reduce committed resources to the region.
Competition
Traditional business teachings suggest that relationships are either competitive or
cooperative. Recent research shows that businesses can enter relationships that involve both
cooperation and competition and this phenomenon has been occurring for some time. Known as
‘coopetition’ it has a place on the cooperation – conflict continuum. The question the planners
examined regarding coopetition involved defining its purpose within the context of great power
competition. The assessments of the team recognized that the rules-based international order
was established after WW II created an economic system the largely benefited the prevailing
countries of the Second World War. An argument has been made that the Grand Strategy of
United States over the second half of the last century was to use its military power to deter war
while creating a global economic system that encourages all countries to be a part of the global
system under free trade (Kennan, 1948). As more and more countries become integrated into the
global economic system, they are less likely to resort to military force to change the system as
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they acquire more wealth. This led to the team to examine the concept of multipoint
competition. In retrospect, each competitive approach might be considered alternatives to
generic offensive or defensive strategies (e.g., collusive strategies). Given the complexity of
relationships among the U.S., Russia, and Iran, where we battle in several different domains
(currency, trade, technology, military, etc.), all engagements can and should be categorized as
part of a “multipoint competition”, a situation when rivals compete in more than one market.6
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Appendix 2.1: Operational Planning Team (OPT) Structure
DESCRIPTION. An Operational Planning Team is a cross-functional team of subjectmatter experts (SMEs) who come together to write a plan. The OPT normally consists of:
Table 2.1A. Operational Planning Team Composition.
Position
Lead Planner

Land operations planner

Area of Responsibility or Expertise
Responsible for the overall synchronization and integration of all aspects of
the plan. Normally a dedicated planner from the Plans and Policy
Directorate
Supports the Lead Planner and runs the planning session if the Lead Planner
is unavailable. Normally a dedicated planner from the Operations
Directorate
Responsible for planning operations that occur in the ground domain

Maritime operations planner

Responsible for planning operations that occur at sea

Air operations planner

Responsible for planning operations that occur in the air domain

Cyber planner

Responsible for planning the offensive and defensive operations in the cyber
domain

Intelligence planner

Responsible for providing information on the adversary as integrating the
numerous intelligence assets and capabilities into the plan

Special Operations planner

Responsible for irregular warfare planning normally involving special
operations forces

Logistics planner

Responsible for supplies, transportation, engineering, life support, and
material management within the plan

Medical planner

Responsible for casualty evacuation and medical treatment of wounded
service members within the area of operation

Information operations planner

Responsible for the messaging, community relations, public affairs,
psychological operations and military deception efforts

Legal planner

Responsible to ensure the measures in the plan remain legal as codified in
the treaties and agreements signed by the United States and the activities
and actions remain in accordance with U.S. Code
Responsible for command, control, communications and computer support
needed for the various headquarters to communicate with each other

Assistant Lead Planner

Communications planner

Interagency planner

Responsible for integrating the requirements of other U.S. government
Departments and Agencies into the plan
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Appendix 2.2: Legal Justification for Military Action*
* An excerpt from “The Planner Handbook – OPT Edition” by Colonel Thomas Fisher, Lulu
Publishing, July 2017
1.

CASUS BELLI (The Case for a War). Casus belli is a Latin expression meaning

the justification for acts of war. Casus means "incident", "rupture" or indeed "case", while belli
means bellic ("of war"). It is usually distinguished from casus foederis, where casus belli refers
to offenses or threats directly against a nation, and casus foederis refers to offenses or threats to a
fellow allied nation with which the justifying nation is engaged in a mutual defense treaty, such
as NATO.
The term came into wide usage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the
writings of Hugo Grotius (1653), Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1707), and Jean-Jacques
Burlamaqui (1732), among others, and the rise of the political doctrine of jus ad bellum or "just
war theory". Informal usage varies beyond its technical definition to refer to any "just cause" a
nation may claim for entering into a conflict. As such, it has been used both retroactively to
describe situations in history before the term came into wide usage and in the present day when
describing situations when war has not been formally declared.
Formally, a government would lay out its reasons for going to war, as well as its
intentions in prosecuting it and the steps that might be taken to avert it. In so doing, the
government would attempt to demonstrate that it was going to war only as a last resort (ultima
Ratio) and that it in fact possessed "just cause" for doing so. In theory international law today
allows only three situations as legal cause to go to war: out of self-defense, defense of an ally
under a mutual defense pact, or sanctioned by the UN.
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2.

JUS AD BELLUM (The Right to Go to War). In modern terms, just war is waged

in terms of self-defense, or in defense of another (with sufficient evidence). See Article 51 of the
UN Charter.
•

Just cause. The reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot therefore be

solely for recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong; innocent life must
be in imminent danger and intervention must be to protect life.
•

Comparative justice. While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a

conflict, to overcome the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party
must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other. Some theorists such as Brian Orend omit
this term, seeing it as fertile ground for exploitation by bellicose regimes.
•

Competent authority. Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. A

just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions
of justice. Dictatorships (e.g. Hitler's Regime) or deceptive military actions (e.g. the 1968 US
bombing of Cambodia) are typically considered as violations of this criterion. The importance of
this condition is key. Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a
system that represses the process of genuine justice.
•

Right intention. Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that

purpose—correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or
maintaining economies is not.
•

Last resort. Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have

been seriously tried and exhausted or are clearly not practical. It may be clear that the other side
is using negotiations as a delaying tactic and will not make meaningful concessions.
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•

Proportionality. The anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate

to its expected evils or harms. This principle is also known as the principle of macroproportionality, so as to distinguish it from the Jus ad Bellum principle of proportionality.
•

Probability of success. Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where

disproportionate measures are required to achieve success.
3.

JUS IN BELLO. (Right Conduct in War) Once war has begun, just war theory

(Jus in bello) also directs how combatants are to act or should act:
•

Distinction. Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction.

The acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants
caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian
residential areas that include no military targets and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal
against civilians. Moreover, combatants are not permitted to target with violence enemy
combatants who have surrendered or who have been captured or who are injured and not
presenting an immediate lethal threat.
•

Proportionality. Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of

proportionality. An attack cannot be launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the
incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage (principle of proportionality).
•

Military necessity. Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of

minimum force. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy,
it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property
must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.
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•

Fair treatment of prisoners of war. Enemy soldiers who surrendered or who are

captured no longer pose a threat. It is therefore wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them.
•

No means malum in se. Soldiers may not use weapons or other methods of

warfare which are considered evil, such as mass rape, forcing soldiers to fight against their own
side or using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled (e.g. nuclear weapons).
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Appendix 2.3: Background on the Competition Between the U.S. and Iran*
* An excerpt from The Proxy Dilemma: Capability and Resolve in US–Iranian Competition by
Major Alex Deep, The Modern War Institute at West Point, May 2018
The competition between the United States and Iran has been continuous since the
inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979, and both sides have suffered casualties in this long,
unconventional war. For Iran, its historical fear of foreign intervention, sense of encirclement by
the United States, and aspiration as a regional power drive the external operations for which the
Iranian Republican Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is responsible.7 For the United States,
its fear of terrorist threats against its territory and citizens, the persistent possibility of nuclear
proliferation by state or non-state actors, and the desire to maintain stable global energy markets
drive its operations in the Middle East. As the United States and Iran continue to operate in the
same battle space, tactical tensions between the two sides remain high, with respective proxies
often in direct conflict. Iran’s ongoing attempt to establish a Shia crescent from Tehran to Beirut
by way of Iraq and Syria, while leveraging Shia populations to destabilize Gulf States, have put
it at odds with American attempts to support its Arab allies and conduct counterterrorism. Even
as the international community hopes for a degree of rapprochement between the two sides with
the signing of the JCPOA, the fundamental divergence of national foreign policy goals will put
the United States and Iran in direct competition over influence in the Middle East.
According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, the United States “seeks a Middle East
that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power
hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market.”8 While the
gradual liberalization and democratization of the Middle East remains an ideological goal of the

7

8

Perthes, “Ambition and Fear.”
Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
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United States, experiences with the sudden upheaval of authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Libya,
and Syria have tempered the willingness of the United States to intervene militarily unless for
direct national security concerns such as counterterrorism or energy security. The United States
uses military, informational, diplomatic, and economic means by which to accomplish these
goals, but it relies increasingly on its unconventional capability to compete with Iranian efforts to
undermine US strategic goals.
Whereas the United States views Iran as a potential revisionist state seeking to disrupt the
Middle East, Iran views its behavior as strategically defensive against would-be aggressors.9
Accordingly, Iran’s objectives in the Middle East are to exhaust the United States and its allies,
resulting in an American withdrawal from the region;10 deter aggression from both the United
States and regional adversaries;11 defeat Sunni terrorist groups;12 and gain influence with Arab
states by supporting regimes amiable to the Islamic Republic. 13 Iran relies primarily on the IRGC
– QF to accomplish many of these goals by maintaining proxy groups within the borders of Arab
states. These efforts are often at the non-state level, since the governments of Iraq and Syria have
become increasingly weak military partners and since other regimes in the Middle East oppose
Iranian influence. For Iran, the IRGC’s goal of exporting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution to
other states underwrites much of the activities that put Iran at odds with the United States.
However, as much as the United States is not necessarily confined by its ideological goal of
spreading liberal democratic values to the Middle East, Iran does not limit itself to ideological

Farhi, “Iranian Power Projection Strategy and Goals,” 1.
Doran, “Heirs of Nasser,” 348.
11
Farhi, “Iranian Power Projection Strategy and Goals,” 2.
12
Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, 22
13
El-Bar, “Proxies and Politics.”
9

10
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struggles when it comes to its foreign policy objectives as seen in its support for the largely
secular regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Figure 2.1A. Map of the Middle East.
Iran tends to utilize its unconventional capability, led by the IRGC – QF, in the pursuit of
its goals, whereas the United States skews toward traditional state-to-state alliance structures,
through special operations and conventional forces from the US Special Operations Command
and US Central Command respectively. However, Iran also uses state partners in Iraq and Syria
toward its counter–Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Da’esh) goals, and the United States uses
non-state actors such as the Kurdish Peoples Protection Units and Syrian Arab groups under the
umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces toward its counterterrorism objectives. That said, the
trend in both the United States and Iran has been toward leveraging their respective special
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operations forces to pursue their separate foreign policy goals by developing, maintaining, and
relying on relationships with both state and non-state actors in the region.
This unconventional competition between the United States and Iran has existed since the
1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut attributed to a burgeoning IRGC-sponsored
terrorist organization, the major asymmetry in this competition has been the traditionally
conventional response by the United States to unconventional aggression by Iran. However, the
increased development of irregular forces and surrogate groups by the United States—as
authorized in Title 12 of the National Defense Authorization Act and through Title 10 and Title
50 of the US Code delineating military operations, intelligence activities, and covert action—has
created multiple potential conflict areas where groups aligned with the United States and Iran
compete regionally.
Currently, this competition puts US and Iranian forces, allies, and proxies on opposite
sides of the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars. Conversely, the United States and Iran share a
counter-Da’esh objective in both Iraq and Syria, but they disagree on both the means by which to
defeat Da’esh and the very nature of the regimes that should rule the Iraqi and Syrian people.
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Appendix 2.4: Problem Theory
There is more than one way to address a complex problem. In most cases, there is never
a definitive ‘solution’. That is what makes them complex. In this case, the planners knew they
had to think differently about the approach to the problem so defining it properly is extremely
important. Einstein said, “If I had 1 hour to save the planet, I would spend 55 minutes defining
the problem and 5 minutes solving it.” Many times, units are so into the details of doing random
tactical activity in an effort to ‘do something’ that the actions themselves become meaningless. A
Direct approach is what most organizations pursue. My adversary or competitor is doing this at
this particular point in time, so I need to go there and do something that complicates his chances
for success. It is a very elementary approach to a complex problem. Because it is easy to
understand, people naturally default to their comfort zone and maintain this binary, twodimensional approach. The result is we end up playing checkers while our adversary is playing
chess.
Consider the following differences between well-structured, medium structured and illstructured problems:
Table 2.2A. Characteristics of Difference Problem Types.
Well-Structured
“Puzzle”
The problem is selfevident. Structuring is
trivial.

Medium-Structured
“Complicated”
Professionals easily agree on
its structure.

Ill-Structured
“Complex”
Professionals will have difficulty
agreeing on problem structure and
will have to agree on a shared
starting hypothesis.

Solution
Development

There is only one right
solution. It may be
difficult to find.

Professionals will disagree on:
• How the problem can be solved.
• The most desirable end state.
• Whether it can be attained.

Execution of
Solution

Success requires learning
to perfect technique.

There may be more than one
“right” answer. Professionals
may disagree on the best
solution. Desired end state can
be agreed.
Success requires learning to
perfect technique and adjusts
solution.

Adaptive
Iteration

No adaptive iteration
required.

Adaptive iteration is required
to find the best solution.

Adaptive iteration is required both
to refine problem structure and to
find the best solution.

Problem
Structuring

134

Success requires learning to
perfect technique, adjust solution,
and refine problem framing.

Types of problems and Solution Strategies14
Remember: Problems are not Puzzles. Puzzles have singular solutions. Problems have a variety
of options that may or may not solve the problem.
•

Complicated: composed of elaborately interconnected parts.

•

Complex: so complicated or intricate as to be hard to understand or deal with a complex
problem.

14

U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, January 28, 2008
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CHAPTER THREE:
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION CASE STUDY

Abstract
Numerous academic studies point to an increasingly complex competitive environment as
a key friction point for effective decision-making at the strategic level in the 21st Century.
Advancements in technology, the development and dispersion of social media platforms and the
significant increase in the amount of data immediately available to decision-makers at all levels
complicate their ability to make effective and timely decisions. McMillan and Overall (2016)
identify several germane concerns related to increasing complexity in the ‘outer environment’
and its impact on strategic management, specifically decision-making and its associated effects
on the ‘inner environment’(McMillan & Overall, 201615; Simon16):
•

The conventional doctrines of strategic management have, as their premise, the
reduction and control of disequilibria, unknowns and random events. They focus on
various frameworks where the problems are known and understood, the means-ends
relationships are complicated but deterministic and knowledge and expertise can be
applied by using formal mathematical models and conventional tools of linear
analysis.

15

McMillan, C. & Overall, J. (2016). Wicked problems: turning strategic management upside down. Journal of Business
Strategy, 37(1), 34-43
16
Simon, H. (1969). The sciences of the artificial [3rd ed.], 6. The MIT Press
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•

Strategic approaches to complex problems are misaligned with the problems
themselves and potentially make firms ill-equipped to address wicked problems with
simplistic approaches.

•

Strategic misalignments arise when organizations use a decision-making system
designed to address environmental uncertainties that assume linear models with
limited cognitive complexity and computational deliberation.

•

Unfortunately, real-world social systems displaying novelty, disruptive change and
social dynamics are not governed by stable, linear causal mechanisms.

The Department of Defense also maintains this immature level of understanding as it
relates to its problem-solving architecture. Many of its systems are based on outdated, linear
approaches to strategic analysis that are ill-suited for the challenges inherent in an increasingly
complex operational environment. Determining a more relevant approach based on the
introduction of a new artifact for use in the current processes is required to enhance the
Department’s collective understanding of problem-solving requirements and applicable
processes for this new environment.
Such observations lead to essential questions worthy of the rigorous application of
Design Science Research: Are strategy makers misaligning their internal decision structures to
address ill-structured problems based on stable, linear casual processes developed over the
course of the 19th and 20th centuries? An abductive approach using DSR should enable a broader
understanding of the dynamics associated with growing complexity and uncertainty in this new
operational environment. Based on a literature review of studies examining the relationship
between complexity and decision-making, one can infer that this understanding is essential to
making correct relevant decisions for any organization. However, our understanding of the
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impact of complexity (as well as volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity – associated with the
VUCA framework) on the decision-making appears to be in a nascent stage both within the
business research community as well as the defense community.
This case study uncovers additional artifacts that corroborates the recommendations of
the first article by providing examples of the design challenges that planners encounter in
practice and the solutions they developed. This case study provides additional corroborating
evidence for the rationale associated with the recommendations of the new, “Dynamic-Recursive
Military Design Model.”
Designing an Artifact for Co-Opetition Collaboration
Numerous academic studies point to an increasingly complex competitive environment as
a key friction point for effective decision-making at the strategic level in the 21st Century.
Advancements in technology, the development and dispersion of social media platforms and the
significant increase in the amount of data immediately available to decision-makers at all levels
complicate their ability to make effective and timely decisions.
Introduction
McMillan and Overall identify several germane concerns related to increasing complexity
in the ‘outer environment’ and its impact on strategic management, specifically decision-making
and its associated effects on the ‘inner environment’(McMillan & Overall, 201617; Simon18):
•

“Current strategic approaches to complex problems are misaligned with the

problems themselves and potentially make firms ill-equipped to address wicked problems
with simplistic approaches.” (McMillan & Overall, 2016)

17

McMillan, C. & Overall, J. (2016). Wicked problems: turning strategic management upside down. Journal of Business
Strategy, 37(1), 34-43
18
Simon, H. (1969). The sciences of the artificial [3rd ed.], 6. The MIT Press.
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•

“Strategic misalignments arise when organizations use a decision-making system

designed to address environmental uncertainties that assume linear models with limited
cognitive complexity and computational deliberation.” (McMillan & Overall, 2016)
Such observations beg questions worthy of answers through the application of scientific
method19 and the use of Action Design Research (ADR)20. Action Design Research enables the
development of solution domains where a problem domain is identified in practice.21 The
problem domain for this study involved an increasingly restrained ability to address crises
originating in the Middle East due to a continuing reduction in available resources needed to
address those challenges. In an environment of increasingly scarce resources, are strategic
decision-makers misaligning their current internal decision structures that support addressing
emerging complex problems?
The scope of this study is limited to a group of military planners from several countries
focused on developing a multi-stakeholder process that enables their respective organizations to
collectively maximize the resources each has committed independently to various missions in the
area of concern. With the drawdown of resources committed to addressing the challenges
emanating from overseas, Allies and partners have realized that individually, each organization
may not have enough resources to effectively manage emerging problems across a broad region.
However, if they can collectively leverage the efforts of others toward obtaining common goals,
collectively this group of like-minded organizations could increase their respective probabilities
of success.

19

Scientific Method as defined by Bhattacherjee, A. (2012). Social science research: Principles, methods, and practices [2nd ed.]
Hevner, A., & Chatterjee, S. (2010). Design research in information systems, 182. Springer
21
Sein, M., Henfridsson, O., Purao, S., Rossi, M., & Lindgren, R. (2011). Action design research. MIS Quarterly: Management
Information Systems, 35(1), 37-56
20
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To study the process of developing an artifact for managing this increasingly complex
environment and modify current decision-making processes to address emerging complex
problems, Design Science Research (DSR) provides a useful method to study the relationship
between identifying emerging problems and developing solutions in a timely and dynamic
fashion required by the complex operating environment in which those solutions are
implemented.
Creating a new process (i.e. the Artifact) based on the design research model is useful
because this artifact will improve decision-making in a complex, non-linear operational
environment. The artifact should enable the organizations to collect pertinent data for
understanding the dynamics within the operational environment and use it as a basis to inform
their respective decision-making frameworks. Therefore, the DSR method chosen for
conducting this research was Action Design Research (ADR) through participation in the
diagnosis, design and implementation of the artifact. The process occurred over the course of
eight months with four interventions that involved iterative evaluation sessions with the
organizations’ senior leadership.
Literature Review
In reviewing the literature to identify theories and research applicable to this problem, the
emerging paradigm of co-opetition provided the most useful concept to support this effort. This
paradigm is distinct from cooperative or competitive approaches due to its focus on simultaneity
between the two paradigms.22 Because of the informal nature of the multinational effort and lack
of corresponding national direction, the planners acknowledged that although their organizations
were cooperating to achieve similar goals in the area of concern there was still a competitive

22

Bengtsson, M., Eriksson, J., & Wincent, J. (2010). Co-opetition dynamics. Competitiveness Review, 20, 194-214
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aspect of the relationship from a national perspective. The State Department and respective
Foreign Ministries still compete for influence in the region. Sales of military equipment to
partners in the region yield a competitive business dynamic that was also recognized and
understood among the planners. “A better understanding of how competition and cooperation
contribute to the dynamics can be of importance in areas such as competition legislation and
policy” (Bengtsson et al., 2010).
The concept for coopetition most applicable for this research is to view it as a strategy.23
One problem with developing the required artifact was the lack of a common strategy among all
the stakeholders to guide the collective effort. There is no overarching policy document
governing the efforts of all the organizations involved. Therefore, a more informal approach to
achieving objectives of mutual interest involve some of the co-opetition dynamics identified in
the literature.
The second source of literature comes from military sources. As part of the research to
prepare for the second intervention and design of the artifact in Stage 2 of the ADR process, the
planners each reviewed their own national doctrine to find historical products or procedures to
aid in the development of an artifact for collaboration and coordination. During the late 1990s,
the Department of Defense used an analytical tool for developing strategies called a Strategic
Estimate24. This Estimate examined a commander’s area of responsibility, identified challenges
and made recommendations to the President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs based on the analysis. Because the challenge was to develop a common understanding of
the operational environment among the stakeholders, the U.S. military doctrine provided a

23

Mariani, M. (2007) Coopetition as an emergent strategy: Empirical evidence from an Italian consortium of opera houses.
International Studies of Management and Organization, 37(2), 97-126.
24
Department of Defense. (2001). Joint publication 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
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starting point to identify key components of the desired artifact that eventually became the Multistakeholder Strategic Estimate. The latest format for the DOD Strategic Estimate is provided in
Appendix 3.2.
The Problem Space
The basic problem facing the planners was trying to develop an approach for employing
resources available to each organization in a coordinated manner without having an agreed upon
framework. All coalitions to date have been formed based on policy decisions and
corresponding military directives for action that establish a legal basis for the combined
operation. For example, when military resources were committed to the mission in Bosnia, there
was a political agreement that defined the goals and objectives of the mission called the Dayton
Accords and a subsequent military agreement that defined how each national military
organization committed to the mission would interact known as the Military Technical
Agreement. In this case, there was only a verbal agreement by several commanders to work
together to enhance their various efforts in the region by coordinating and collaborating with
each other. The intent was to leverage the effects of each organization’s respective efforts to
collectively pursue objectives that were of common interest.
However, there was not a common mission, strategy or framework that all the
organizations would execute. Each had their own interests, objectives and missions at different
locations throughout the region. As the planners looked for historical examples for developing
the approach directed by their leadership, it became apparent that such an approach involving an
‘informal coalition’ had not been used before. Therefore, a new process was required involving
the development of several artifacts.
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The stakeholders were the operational headquarters of several nations currently
conducting operations in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these operations were in support
of the United Nations. Some were in support of bi-lateral agreements with various nations in the
region. Due to the number of global commitments, there was a declining amount of resources
available to execute the operations in their areas of responsibility effectively. This drove the
requirement to take a more holistic approach to the region by attempting to leverage the
individual efforts of each organization toward accomplishing similar objectives. The resulting
efficiencies should offset the reduction in resources as part of the strategy.
Time was also a factor. As some of the missions had been ongoing for decades (e.g.
UNIFIL, the U.N. mission in Lebanon), there was a requirement to reduce the amount of forces
committed to the region in order to restore service readiness for executing new missions
elsewhere around the globe. Therefore, there was an urgency to implement the new process
quickly. Recognizing there would be periodic evaluations regarding the fitness of the new
product, the artifact would continue to evolve over time provided the ADR process was
conducted properly.
Finally, there were numerous challenges to be addressed within the operational
environment. Based on the following facts, several inferences are made as the basis for a solution
that the artifact had to address:
•

FACT: The counter-ISIS campaign was nearing competition.

•

FACT: Al Qaeda morphed into Al Qaeda in Iraq which then evolved into ISIS.

•

INFERENCE: A new terrorist organization will emerge following the defeat of

ISIS and constitute a new threat to the respective Homelands.
•

FACT: The Iranians continue to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz.
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•

FACT: The Houthis have fired on commercial shipping passing through the Bab

al Mandeb.
•

FACT: The global economy is affected by the free flow of commerce globally.

•

FACT: Three of the six strategic chokepoints on the planet are in the region.

•

INFERENCE: There will be a continuing requirement to ensure the free flow of

resources from the Middle East.
•

FACT: Much of Syria remains ungoverned.

•

FACT: There is a refugee crisis affecting Lebanon, Jordan and much of Europe.

•

INFERENCE: Missions that support or stabilize governments in the Middle East

will continue to require resources.
These inferences provided the reasoning needed to identify goals common to all the
stakeholders and were crucial to developing a solution to the problem. Given the stakeholders
involved, the time available and challenges each headquarters had to consider, the basic problem
regarding the lack of a common framework from which decisions could be made to coordinate
future action required a solution. The solution required the development of a process for
enhanced decision-making in a collaborative relationship among the stakeholders.
The Solution Space
The Solution Space consists of current systems used by each headquarters that can be
combined and captured in a single document. This document must be managed through a new,
unique process that keeps it updated and relevant. In the event of the next crisis in the Middle
East, this process provides a common understanding among the various headquarters so there is a
common perspective for discussing the ramifications of any future crisis. In theory, this should
provide a more informed discussion from which national decisions can be made. Thus, the
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hypothesis used to develop the solution consisted of developing this artifact(s) by identifying and
detailing new methods for using collaborative measures to shape the operational environment.
Because each headquarters was leveraging the efforts of other stakeholders, it reduced costs and
increases efficiency.
In order to develop the artifact(s) necessary to solve the problem, several interventions
took place. The first intervention took place in July 2018 focused on the Diagnosis Stage of the
ADR processes which centered on defining the problem. Over the course of a week, the planners
had to frame the operational environment to establish a common frame of reference whereby
activities in each headquarters that contribute to common goals could be identified. Without a
common strategic context to provide the foundation for multilateral collaboration, there could be
no unified effort to address the challenges with the operational environment. Once they agreed
upon this start state for the effort, they next had to identify the desired operational environment
and determine the problem that was keeping the current operational environment from becoming
the desired one. This became the problem that had to be resolved through the development of
decision tools and processes to enable a more collaborative approach toward shaping this
operational environment. Once they had framed the operational environment and the problem to
solve, they codified the recommended way forward in an artifact that created an agreed upon
framework for developing the new process directed by their commanders. This initial artifact is
known as the Terms of Reference (TOR). The format for this artifact is captured in Appendix
3.1.
The second intervention took place in December 2018 and used the artifact developed
during the Diagnosis stage to develop the new process for improving multinational collaboration
and coordination among the respective headquarters during the Design stage of ADR. This
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second artifact was a written product called a Strategic Estimate that was designed to assess the
current environment, identify trends and actors that could negatively affect the current
environment and national interests in the region and provide decision support tools that enable a
collaborative approach. The Strategic Estimate format is captured in Appendix 3.2.
The third intervention took place in February 2019 thus completing the Design Stage of
the DSR process. The draft estimate was updated based on initial feedback from the respective
staffs and then each headquarters obtained feedback from their respective national leadership.
Once the first update was complete, it was sent to the respective national leadership for comment
completing the Design stage.
The fourth intervention involved the Implementation Stage and began in March 2019
when all the commanders met, reviewed the artifact and discussed the recommendations and
potential decisions outlined in the updated Strategic Estimate.
The Model Space
The first intervention focused on the problem of developing an artifact that provided an
agreed upon framework for developing the process for a non-binding collaborative effort. The
challenge the planners addressed was identifying mutual national interests in the region that each
stakeholder was charged with pursuing. Every nation has several interests in the region, but they
are not the same interests. Additionally, the method a given headquarters uses for pursuing those
interests are also different. Most military headquarters develop a campaign to synchronize
activity in time, space and purpose as a method to pursue specified interests defined by the
missions they are assigned. In this case however, there were differing national interests that led
to different priorities resulting in different missions and campaigns.
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To resolve this challenge, the planners developed a Terms of Reference (See Appendix
3.1) to define what was to be accomplished by the planning effort. It was important to produce a
written product that clearly spelled out the agreed upon expectations of the common effort for
each stakeholder in order to determine if the allocation of planning bandwidth was worth the
investment. Additionally, there were different languages among the stakeholders so having a
written and translated document created a common understanding of these expectations which
was extremely important.
The Terms of Reference created addressed five major areas. The first was establishing a
legal basis for collaboration. As there were no written directives from each national capital it
was important to identify applicable UN security council resolutions and similar agreements
between nations for the various military activities in the Middle East. This provided each
commander with a solid legal basis for collaboration and explained the purpose behind the
collective activities each headquarters would support.
The next area developed was agreement upon common objectives the collective
organizations would achieve. These were developed based on the mutual national interests
common to all headquarters. Obviously, there were objectives not included and the priority of
the objectives differed between all the stakeholders. These objectives became a starting point to
determine what current operations and activities each organization was executing in support of
those objectives. Subsequent analysis could then determine the combined effect each discreet
effort had toward achieving those agreed upon objectives. This would allow the planners to
identify actions that were redundant as well as areas where no one was acting to achieve the
agreed upon objectives so those gaps could be addressed.
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The third area was defining the geographic area where the operations would be assessed
and tracked. Because each headquarters viewed the region differently and had different
mandates for action globally, there was a requirement to specify what operations would be
captured and discussed as part of this effort.
The fourth area discussed in the Terms of Reference involved the approach the planners
would use to develop and implement the new multi-stakeholder process. There was a concern
that the process may turn out to be of little value. Therefore, the planners agreed that this new
effort would consist of a series of steps. The first step was the creation of a common
understanding of all the actions each military headquarters was conducting. Additionally, a
common understanding would be created that assessed the actions of various problem sets in the
region and trends affecting the operational environment. Combining these two approaches to
common understanding would then allow the planners to develop decision support tools that
would assess risk and enable commanders to make more timely and informed decisions
regarding allocation of limited resources and activity. The analysis would be captured and
updated in the Multi-stakeholder Strategic Estimate.
If this artifact proved useful in coordinating the actions of the various headquarters
pursing their individual campaigns, the next step would be to develop a common strategy as a
framework for common action. In the first step, each headquarters would use the common
understanding of the operational environment to streamline its own operations. This next step
would be to modify current campaigns in support of the common strategy. The final step would
be to create a common campaign and execute it collectively. This would be the most manpower
intensive to produce and the recommendation was to start with simple collaboration and increase
the coordination and planning requirements over time based on the fitness of the artifact.
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Finally, the Terms of Reference addressed the administrative requirements and
responsibilities of each headquarters. These consisted mostly of meeting frequency and
locations, specific production requirements and dates they were due, procedures for updating
those products and the interventions with the organizational leadership. Collectively, these areas
comprised a complete roadmap for developing the specified artifacts and closely followed the
elaborated ADR process.25 In September, the commanders agreed to the Terms and signed the
artifact that provided the guidance and direction for the development of the second artifact (See
Appendix 3.1: Terms of Reference Format).
The second intervention focused on the developing the written Multi-stakeholder
Strategic Estimate that would create a common understanding as defined by the Terms of
Reference (Artifact #1). During the development of the next artifact several challenges emerged.
The first challenge was the different timelines each headquarters used to direct action in the
region. One organization had activity planned out a year in advance and was in the process of
creating the planned activity for the year after. Other headquarters had a smaller amount of
assets to commit and therefore developed plans for employing those assets 6 to 12 months out.
This meant that some organizations were less flexible to address identified gaps than others, so
the planners recognized that the first two of years of this new process would establish a baseline
upon which future decisions could be made in a timelier fashion.
This timeline issue was compounded by a second challenge. It was difficult to predict
future trends in the region in the region that affect national interests 24 months out. It was also
difficult to make an accurate assessment of the operational environment that far out. The
planners decided the Strategic Estimate would use a 12-month planning horizon and update the
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estimate every 90 days. In this way, they would identify potential decisions and friction points
for the upcoming year in an effort to keep the artifact relevant.
The next challenge involved evaluation of risk as it relates to decision-making. Risk is
defined as a combination of probability and consequence. There is a question of how probable
the identified risk is likely to occur. There was also a question of how consequential that risk is
to current operations should it occur. The problem resulted from the definition of consequence.
Consequence was different for each organization therefore risk had to be evaluated differently.
For example, Europeans have a greater problem with refugees from the Middle East because
they can walk there, therefore actions that increase the number refugees was consequential.
Refugees cannot swim to North America, therefore an increase refugees from the Middle East is
less consequential. Subsequently, it was agreed that each organization would determine risk
separately.
Finally, two issues arose regarding the process for measuring success. The objectives
identified in the Terms of Reference were deliberately broad to allow each headquarters
flexibility in determining how to contribute toward achieving the objectives. Because they were
broad, it became problematic to identify common measures of effectiveness and performance
because each stakeholder had a different definition. These issues drove the development of
another artifact – the system to identify and assess trends in a dynamic environment (See
Appendix 3.3: Trend Analysis Format).
Additionally, there were actors outside the Middle East that were influencing events in
the Middle East but due to the definition of the region provided in the Terms of Reference, it was
problematic to determine which actions should be included in the analysis. This led to questions
as to whether the region was defined properly in the Terms of Reference. This forced a
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reevaluation of the first artifact consistent with the Evaluation, Reflection and Learning phases of
the DSR Diagnosis Cycle.
Overall, the design of the artifact revealed that definitions are important. With planners
speaking different languages and no agreed upon doctrine for conducting ‘informal multinational
operations’ it was important to identify concepts and requirements associated with the artifact
and then define them clearly. This improved the common understanding among the planners and
subsequently their respective headquarters. This was captured in the format created for the
second Artifact: Multi-stakeholder Strategic Estimate (See Appendix 3.2: Strategic Estimate
Format).
The Third Intervention was the Evaluation of the artifact by the senior leaders of the
respective organizations participating in the Multi-stakeholder collaboration. The senior leaders
approved the Estimate as presented and stated that it had accurately captured the efforts of all
organizations to accomplish unilateral objectives that supported goals common to all
stakeholders. The estimate was subsequently sent to each of their higher headquarters and
endorsed by their respective leadership. The only contention was that one of the leaders present
observed during the next session to review the next version of the estimate:
“You know, the last time we met to review these trends we acknowledged the
assessment that a few were trending poorly. And now we see that the anticipated result
has come to pass. What did we change 3 months ago in our operations to stop this
negative trend from affecting the region as we anticipated? It’s unfortunate we saw
something developing that we didn’t want but failed to do anything about it! On a
positive note, however, the analysis that identified this was going to happen was
exceptional.”
This reinforced the fact that this assessment process has to always focus on decisions for
senior leaders to make decisions to correct the projected course of a military campaign based on
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the problem that campaign was intended to solve, not on whether the unit is executing the
campaign flawlessly.
Conclusion
The most significant discovery identified and documented in this research is the transition
of dominance from nation-states during the last millennium to networks in the 21st Century.
Businesses, criminal elements, violent extremist groups, non-governmental organizations,
refugees and now military organizations are collaborating informally to pursue mutual
objectives. In the past, all these organizations defined their operations largely by geography and
nationality. However, increased connectivity brought on by globalization has created a
requirement for organizations to adapt to the new ‘speed of relevance’. This means informal
methods of collaboration and coordination. Historically, political agreements between nations
drove multinational military operations. However, dwindling resources available for global
operations can be offset by media that increase opportunities for collaborative efforts. The
results of this research provide insight into this growing area of coopetition.
A review of the research conducted to date provides several interesting observations:
•

The research shows that separate headquarters can increase their situational
awareness and develop a common understanding of the operational environment to
improve their current decision-making systems using a Multi-stakeholder Strategic
Estimate.

•

Keeping this artifact updated through a routine process enables decision-makers to
leverage their current business practices along with those of other organizations to
enhance operations. Because of the multinational perspective, creating and
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periodically updating this artifact does not create a redundant or unnecessary
requirement.
•

The challenges identified during the first two interventions document key elements
that must be addressed to effectively develop processes for informal, multistakeholder collaboration and coordination efforts to achieve common objectives.
The updated estimate provides a decision support tool that enables multiple
organizations to operate collaboratively at the speed of relevance.

•

The first artifact created (Terms of Reference) provides an excellent example of
product that places the Problem within a Strategic Context that creates common
understanding. Products like these provide clarity among planners examining the
Problem Space.

•

The use of Abductive Reasoning through Inference was extremely helpful in
developing a hypothesis that defined success. These inferences provided a foundation
for identifying relevant trends for planners examining the Solution Space.

•

The Trends Assessment was a particularly useful tool for assessing multiple, distinct
operational efforts toward accomplishing goals common to multiple organizations
operating in parallel without a common strategy or campaign. Because it was focused
at a level above individual campaigns of each organization involved in the
multilateral effort, it enabled an assessment of the operational environment and the
effect of each campaign toward solving the problem the multilateral effort was
focused on. This is a subtle but important distinction as most assessment focus on
activity associated with an individual campaign instead of an assessment of how the
complex problem is evolving.
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Appendix 3.1: Terms of Reference Format
SUBJECT: The Problem or Planning task the effort will develop (CLASSIFICATION)
1.

(U) Introduction.
a.

(CLASSIFICATION) List the appropriate resolutions, treaties,

international agreements applicable to all stakeholders in the effort.
b.

(CLASSIFICATION) List any combined direction agreed to by all

stakeholders’ leadership.
2.

(CLASSIFICATION) Aim. Provide the purpose of the effort.

3.

(CLASSIFICATION) Intent. Provide the intent for the effort.

4.

(U) Collaboration Objectives.
a.

(CLASSIFICATION) List the objectives for the collaborative effort.

b.

(CLASSIFICATION) List the Strategic Objectives within the Operational

Environment the effort will achieve.
5.

(CLASSIFICATION) Constraints and Restraints.
a.

(CLASSIFICATION) List activities the effort MUST accomplish.

(Constraints)
b.

(CLASSIFICATION) List activities the effort WILL NOT accomplish.

(Restraints)
c.

(CLASSIFICATION) Define the geographic location where activities will

take place.
6.

(CLASSIFICATION) Activities. List the activities the collaboration will

accomplish to achieve the objectives defined in paragraph 4.
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7.

(CLASSIFICATION) Deliverables. List the products the collaboration effort will

produce and the general time when they will be completed.
8.

(CLASSIFICATION) Membership. List the members who will be in charge of

the collaborative effort by stakeholder.
9.

(CLASSIFICATION) Responsibilities. Identify and assign responsibilities to

each member of effort listed in paragraph 8.
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Appendix 3.2: Strategic Estimate Example Format26
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION
1. Background
a. The strategic estimate is an analytical tool available to Commanders before developing
theater or functional strategies; theater, functional or DOD-wide campaign plans, subordinate
campaign plans; and OPLANs. Strategic estimates provide the commander’s perspective of the
strategic and operational levels of the OE, threats and opportunities that could facilitate or hinder
the achievement of GEF-directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional or
functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of how those objectives might be
achieved. Developed annually and regularly updated, the strategic estimate is the basis for
developing the Commander’s theater or functional strategy.
b. The CCDR, the staff, supporting commands, and agencies assess the broad strategic
factors that influence OE, thus informing the ends, ways, means, and risks involved in
accomplishing the prescribed campaign objectives.
c. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned
tasks. CCDRs who support multiple commands may prepare strategic estimates for each
supporting operation.
d. Section B, “Notional Strategic Estimate Format,” presents a format a CCMD staff can
use as a guide when developing a strategic estimate. The J-5 may provide the lead staff
organization for the conduct of the strategic estimate with significant participation from the other
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staff directorates. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among commands,
based on theater-specific requirements and other factors.
e. The result of the strategic estimate is a better understanding and visualization of the
complete OE to include adversaries, friends, and neutrals. The strategic estimate process is
dynamic and continuous and provides input for developing theater strategies and campaign
plans. This strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting more detailed staff
estimates as well as the commander’s estimate of the situation for a potential contingency.
f. The CCDRs strategic estimate should identify potential for spillover, both from the
AOR or functional area perspective into other CCDRs’ AORs or functional areas and into the
CCDR’s AOR or functional area based on operations and activities outside the AOR.
2. Strategic Direction
(This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the
theater or global situation and identifies strategic requirements in global and regional
dimensions.)
a. Stakeholder Policy Goals. (Identify the US national security or military objectives and
strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.)
b. Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the multinational [alliance or coalition]
security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to, or coordinated by
the CCMD.)
c. Opposition Policy Goals and Desired End State
d. End State(s). (Describe the campaign or operation objective[s] or end state[s] and
related military objectives to achieve and end states to attain and maintain.)
3. Operational Environment (OE)
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a. Operational Environment. (Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic,
political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the OE assigned to the
Stakeholder.)
b. Area of Interest. (Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the area
of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary territory. This area also includes
areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)
c. Adversary Forces. (Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be hostile
to, or that may threaten, stakeholder and partner interests, and appraise their general objectives,
motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of the
magnitude of the potential threat.)
d. Friendly Forces. (Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations.
These include assigned US forces, regional allies, and anticipated multinational partners.
Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of power [diplomatic, economic, and
informational], US military supporting commands, and other agencies that could have a direct
and significant influence on the operations in the Operational Environment.)
e. Neutral Forces. (Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the
Operational Environment and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities.
Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they
may impact US and friendly multinational operations.)
4. Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational Challenges
a. This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the operational
environment with which each stakeholder may be tasked to deal.
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b. These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation,
peace operations, and security cooperation (including building partner capacity and capability),
to providing response to atrocities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stability
activities.
5. Potential Opportunities
a. This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances, as well as emerging
situations, that the stakeholders may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic
situation and further US or partner nation interests.
b. Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing
strategic guidance and operational limitations.
6. Assessment of Risks
Risk is the probability and consequence of loss linked to hazards.
a. This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities
in the OE.
b. Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and
categorized according to significance or likelihood (most dangerous or most likely).
c. The staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks.
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Appendix 3.3: Trend Analysis Format

Figure 3.1A. Example Product for Trend Analysis.
•

PRIORITIES were delineated between LOW – MEDIUM – HIGH

•

TRENDS were evaluated as RED = trending worse since last evaluation, YELLOW =
no change to the TREND since the last evaluation and GREEN = trending better since
the last evaluation. TREND analysis was an analysis of RISK to mission

•

ACTIONS fell into 4 groups: Ops = active operations are being conducted to address
the challenge, Plan = a contingency plan was being created for the challenge if the
situation grew worse, Monitor = assets were dedicated to monitor the challenge to
identify if it was worsening, and Transfer = any operational risk associated with the
challenge was being addressed by another agency or partner

161

